Q, R (On the Application Of) v General Medical Council

Under rule 4(5) of the General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise) Rules 2004, the five-year threshold is an objective question of precedent or jurisdictional fact. The relevant date is the actual date of the most recent events giving rise to the allegation, although the Registrar may initially treat the complaint’s dates as prima facie evidence.

The Registrar must investigate further where there is reasonable room for doubt. A public body has an inherent or implied power, and in appropriate circumstances a duty, to revisit and revoke a decision vitiated by a fundamental mistake of fact. That power operates subject to ordinary principles of administrative fairness.

Dr Anup Chaudhuri, a general practitioner, sought judicial review of the General Medical Council’s decision to proceed with a fitness-to-practise allegation concerning treatment provided in 2008. The complaint incorrectly stated that the relevant treatment continued until August 2008, whereas the last consultation was on 22 May 2008.

The GMC decided that rule 4(5) was not engaged and later refused to reconsider that decision after the error was identified. The claim raised three issues: the meaning and operation of the five-year rule, the power to revisit a decision based on factual error, and procedural fairness.

1. The claim succeeded on Grounds 1 and 4. The original rule 4(5) decision was quashed and the matter was remitted to the Registrar for reconsideration.
2. Rule 4(5) contains a rule and a proviso. The first limb asks whether more than five years have elapsed since the actual date of the most recent events giving rise to the allegation. It is a binary, objectively verifiable question of precedent or jurisdictional fact. It is distinct from the proviso, which requires a public-interest judgment in exceptional circumstances. (paras [30]-[40], [68]-[70])
3. The Registrar may rely on the dates stated in the complaint as prima facie evidence of the actual dates. Further investigation is required only where there is reasonable room for doubt. The Registrar’s power under rule 4(4) is available to clarify uncertainty about the relevant dates. (paras [32]-[38], [59], [63]-[66])
4. The GMC’s decision was vitiated by a fundamental and material mistake of fact. The complaint’s reference to August 2008 was wrong; the last consultation occurred in May 2008, more than five years before the complaint. The court therefore had power to intervene. (paras [39]-[40], [68]-[70])
5. Adopting the analysis in Fajemisin v General Medical Council and Porteous v West Dorset District Council, the court held that public bodies possess an inherent or implied power to revisit and revoke decisions based on fundamental mistakes of fact. The power is not confined to minor slips. It may operate at any stage of the fitness-to-practise process and is subject to ordinary administrative fairness. The GMC’s refusal to reconsider was therefore unlawful. (paras [46]-[57])
6. The procedural-unfairness grounds failed. At the initial triage stage the Registrar was not generally required to verify every detail of a complaint or invite representations about dates, absent a special reason for doubt. (paras [58]-[62])

Not stated in the judgment. The proceedings were a first-instance judicial review of the GMC’s internal rule 4(5) decision and subsequent refusal to reconsider.