Domanski v The Regional Court in Warsaw, Poland

Delay alone will rarely make extradition unjust or oppressive. The person resisting extradition bears the burden of proving oppression or injustice on the balance of probabilities and must establish more than ordinary hardship. The court must make an overall judgment, considering factors including the seriousness of the alleged offence, the effect on family members and the length of the delay.

On an appeal concerning Extradition Act 2003 section 21 and Article 8, the appellate court reviews the district judge’s decision for legal error, irrationality or disproportionality. Where the district judge was entitled to reach the conclusions reached, the appeal will be dismissed.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision of District Judge Ikram at Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordering his extradition to Poland under a European Arrest Warrant.

He was wanted to stand trial for conduct alleged to amount to human trafficking and forcing women into prostitution between 2004 and 2005. The issues before the High Court were whether the passage of time made extradition unjust or oppressive under section 14, and whether extradition would disproportionately interfere with the appellant’s and his family’s Article 8 rights under section 21.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The District Judge was entitled to reject both grounds of challenge, and there was no legal error in the conclusions on delay or Article 8.
2. Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the appellant bore the burden of showing on the balance of probabilities that extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of the passage of time. Mere delay is unlikely to suffice. The appellant must show more than hardship of the kind ordinarily associated with extradition.
3. The question is one of overall judgment on the merits. Relevant considerations include the seriousness of the extradition offence, the impact on family members and the sheer length of time. Those factors must be assessed together rather than treating delay as determinative.
4. The District Judge had considered the appellant’s family circumstances, including his parental relationship with his young children, and was entitled to conclude that extradition would not be oppressive. The seriousness of the alleged offence, involving identifiable victims, was also a relevant consideration.
5. In relation to section 21 and Article 8, the High Court’s function on appeal was to review the District Judge’s decision. There was nothing perverse, irrational or legally flawed in the finding that extradition would not constitute a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s or his family’s rights.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: on 27 November 2014, District Judge Ikram ordered the appellant’s extradition to Poland under a European Arrest Warrant.
• High Court (Administrative Court): on 18 February 2015, the appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed.