Thayalan, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

For naturalisation, the applicant must satisfy the Secretary of State on the balance of probabilities that he or she is of good character. The requirement may be unmet even without proof of personal criminal conduct. Active membership of, or significant support for, an organisation known to commit serious crimes may provide sufficient reason for refusal.

The assessment may properly focus on serious past conduct. There is no absolute requirement to adopt a holistic approach, although all material considerations, including youth at the time and subsequent good conduct, must be considered. Later rehabilitation may be relevant but need not outweigh serious earlier conduct. The statutory requirement cannot be displaced by the best interests of the applicant’s child.

The claimant, a Sri Lankan national granted refugee leave after an asylum appeal, applied for naturalisation as a British citizen. The Secretary of State refused the application under paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981, relying on the claimant’s past membership and activities within the LTTE. Reconsideration was also refused.

He sought judicial review, alleging that the Secretary of State applied the wrong evidential test, failed to consider his character throughout his life, failed to follow relevant nationality guidance, and failed to consider the best interests of his British child. The central issues were whether the refusal was lawful and whether the claimant’s later conduct or family circumstances required a different outcome.

1. Claim dismissed. The Secretary of State applied the correct legal tests and her published guidance.
2. Under section 6(1) and paragraph 1(1)(b) of the British Nationality Act 1981, the burden was on the claimant to satisfy the Secretary of State on the balance of probabilities that he was of good character. If she was not so satisfied and had good reason for that view, she was bound to refuse naturalisation.
3. Personal commission of criminal acts was not essential. Membership of an organisation which committed crimes, together with the applicant’s role and activities within it, could be sufficient. The Secretary of State was entitled to rely on the claimant’s own accounts, the findings in his asylum appeal, and objective research.
4. There was no legal requirement to assess character by treating every period of a person’s life as having equal weight. The Secretary of State had considered the claimant’s youth when recruited, the nature and seniority of his LTTE activities, his failure to leave earlier, and his later good conduct in the United Kingdom. That later conduct was relevant, but the serious earlier conduct was capable of outweighing it. Future rehabilitation could not be ruled out.
5. The Secretary of State had considered the claimant’s British child and the submission that the child should share his nationality. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 did not authorise naturalisation contrary to the statutory good-character requirement. The decision was therefore not unlawful because it did not grant citizenship in the child’s best interests.
6. The fourth ground was withdrawn. Grounds one, two and three failed.

The judgment describes an earlier Asylum and Immigration Tribunal appeal, which allowed the claimant’s asylum and human-rights appeal on 14 December 2005. The present proceedings were a first-instance judicial review of the later naturalisation refusals.