Fielden v hristie -Miller & Ors

Statements of case must plead the material facts necessary to formulate the cause of action or defence. They should be concise, logically ordered, and free from evidence, background, argument and rhetoric. A proprietary estoppel claim need not depend on an express representation. It may arise where a claimant acts to his detriment in the belief that he will acquire an interest in another’s land, and the owner knows of and encourages that belief, or stands by while the claimant acts. Permission to amend may be refused where the proposed pleading remains prolix and unintelligible, although a final opportunity to produce a compliant pleading may be given.

The proceedings concerned the succession to the Swyncombe Estate and included a Part 20 claim by Stephen Christie-Miller against trustees of the 1967 Settlement. He alleged that representations, acts and omissions had created a proprietary estoppel concerning Home Farmhouse and his expected succession to the Estate.

The court had previously struck out the claim insofar as it relied on representations not authorised by all the trustees, but had declined to strike it out on the non-fettering ground. Stephen then applied for permission to amend his Part 20 claim. The issue was whether the proposed pleading adequately identified the material facts constituting the estoppel claim.

1. Application refused in its present form. The proposed amended counterclaim was excessive, difficult to comprehend and insufficiently ordered. It included background facts, evidence and argument, and required the reader to move between different pleadings to understand the case.
2. Statements of case must plead only material facts necessary to formulate a cause of action or defence. The requirements identified in Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2015] EWHC 405 (Comm) were of universal application.
3. The proposed pleading failed to deal adequately with the court’s earlier ruling on the unanimity principle. It also did not clearly identify how the alleged acts and omissions supported the wider proprietary estoppel case or how knowledge was to be attributed to each trustee.
4. The court recognised that proprietary estoppel is not dependent on an express oral or written representation. It may arise where a person acts to his detriment believing that he will acquire an interest in another’s land, and the other person knows of and encourages that belief or stands by and permits the detrimental conduct. This principle was drawn from Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18; [2009] 1 WLR 776, and the statement of Oliver J in Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustee Co Ltd (Note) (1979).
5. A further and final opportunity was granted to serve a compliant pleading within 21 days of formal delivery of the judgment. The parties were invited to agree directions and deal with costs in writing if possible.

First-instance decision. The judgment records an earlier strike-out decision in the same proceedings but does not give a separate appellate history.