Bisrat & Ors v Kebede & Ors

[2015] EWHC 840 (Ch)

Case details

Case citations
[2015] EWHC 840 (Ch)
Court
High Court (Chancery Division)
Judgment date
13 February 2015
Judgment text

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Subjects
Equity and trusts Charity law Interlocutory injunctions
Keywords
charity proceedings person interested in a charity unincorporated association trustee dispute interim injunction administration of trust property Charity Commission consent clean hands
Outcome
interim relief granted; claim continued
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In charity proceedings, regular worshippers and contributors with a longstanding connection to a local charitable church may be persons interested in the charity. They need not have a proprietary interest or be beneficiaries in the strict private-trust sense. Charity Commission consent to proceedings ordinarily extends to interlocutory applications properly falling within those proceedings. Under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1991, the court may grant interim injunctive or administrative relief where that is just and convenient, even if equivalent final relief was not sought. The court may regulate the use of trust property where control of the charity is disputed and the trustees are uncertain. Subscription arrears or an alleged failure to disclose a dismissal did not, on these facts, remove the claimants’ interest or establish unclean hands.

Factual background

The claimants were members, regular worshippers and contributors to an Ethiopian Orthodox church operated by an unincorporated charitable association. A dispute had arisen between rival factions concerning the validity of amendments and trustee appointments, and therefore control of the charity and its Battersea premises.

The claim was brought under Part 8 with Charity Commission consent. Pending determination of the substantive issues, the claimants sought directions regulating access to the premises and the conduct of services by the rival groups. The defendants challenged the claimants’ standing, the scope of the Commission’s consent, and the availability of interim relief. They also relied on alleged unclean hands.

Held

  1. Standing. The claimants had sufficient interest to bring charity proceedings. The expression “person interested in the charity” was not confined to persons with a proprietary interest or beneficiaries in the strict private-trust sense. Applying the approach in Haslemere Estates v Baker [1982] 1 WLR ER 1109, and distinguishing Bradshaw v University College of Wales Aberystwyth [1989] 1 WLR 190 and Rosenzweig v NMC Recordings Ltd [2013] EWHC 3792 (Ch), the claimants’ longstanding membership, worship and contributions placed them on the charity side of the line. Their interest was materially greater than that of ordinary members of the public. The guidance in Re Hampton Fuel Allotment Charity [1989] Ch 484 was satisfied.
  2. Interlocutory jurisdiction. The Charity Commission’s consent to the Part 8 proceedings was sufficient for interlocutory applications properly made within their purview. It was unnecessary to obtain separate consent for every procedural or interim step. Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1991 empowered the court to grant an interim injunction where just and convenient, even though equivalent final relief was not expressly claimed.
  3. Administration pending trial. The court could administer the trust and give directions binding those in de facto control where the lawful trustees were uncertain. It would not decline to act merely because there might be no validly appointed trustee. Interim directions allowing the rival groups to use the church on alternate days, preventing disruption, and regulating access to the keys and Holy Tabot represented the solution causing the least injustice pending trial.
  4. Unclean hands and subscriptions. The alleged non-disclosure of a priest’s dismissal did not establish unclean hands. Nor did unpaid subscriptions, even assuming they were unjustified, extinguish the claimants’ status as persons interested. Permission to appeal was refused.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

This was a first-instance interlocutory decision. The court refused permission to appeal; any application for permission was to be made to the Court of Appeal.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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