Trail Riders Fellowship v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

[2015] EWHC 85 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2015] EWHC 85 (Admin) · [2015] CN 147
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
26 January 2015
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Public law Highways and rights of way
Keywords
definitive map modification order byway open to all traffic bridleway vehicular rights RUPP error of law irrationality judicial review public user evidence
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A challenge under paragraph 12 of Schedule 15 to the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 is confined to errors of law. The court must not retry factual issues or substitute its assessment of documentary and user evidence for that of the inspector. An inspector’s evaluative judgment may be challenged only for irrationality, failure to apply the correct legal test, failure to consider a material matter, or consideration of an immaterial matter. The weight given to relevant evidence is for the inspector. Historical classification as a restricted byway or RUPP may provide some evidence of possible vehicular rights, but does not establish them. Descriptive terms such as “lane” do not determine highway status. Where the evidence reasonably permits competing conclusions, an inspector’s choice between them is not irrational.

Factual background

The claimant challenged an inspector’s decision confirming, with modifications, an order concerning Bradley Lane. The order substituted bridleway for byway open to all traffic. The route was accepted to be a highway, but the claimant sought recognition of public vehicular rights so that motorcycles could continue to use it.

The inspector considered historical documents, maps and evidence of public use. He concluded that vehicular status had not been established on the balance of probabilities and that the route should be recorded as a bridleway. The claimant alleged errors of law concerning the significance of an adjoining RUPP, the route’s omission from the definitive map, its description as a lane, and the user evidence. The central issue was whether those complaints disclosed an error of law rather than an impermissible challenge to factual judgment.

Held

  1. The claim was dismissed. Under paragraph 12 of Schedule 15 to the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, the court could intervene only if the order was outside the statutory powers or a procedural failure had substantially prejudiced the claimant. As in claims under sections 288 and 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the challenge was confined to error of law.

  2. The inspector was an expert tribunal. The court could not review the factual issues or substitute its own view of the evidence. Intervention was justified only if the inspector applied the wrong test, failed to consider a material matter, considered an immaterial matter, or reached a conclusion that was irrational or perverse. The weight given to relevant evidence was for the inspector.

  3. The recording of the adjoining route as a RUPP was capable of carrying some weight, but it did not establish vehicular rights. The statutory scheme preserved the possibility of rights beyond foot and bridleway rights. The inspector was entitled to conclude that the designation was not a reliable indicator that vehicular rights in fact existed.

  4. The omission of Bradley Lane from the definitive map, together with its appearance in highway maintenance records, showed at most that it was regarded as a highway. It did not compel the conclusion that it carried unrestricted vehicular rights. The inspector was entitled to regard the omission as an error or failure to appreciate that the route was a highway, particularly given the evidence concerning the route’s poor condition and limited use.

  5. The word “lane” was descriptive and did not determine the class of highway. Nor did the description “High Street” establish vehicular rights over the whole route. The inspector was entitled to assess the evidence as a whole.

  6. The historical and railway evidence could support, but did not require, a finding of vehicular status. The user evidence did not establish statutory dedication and was insufficient to infer dedication at common law. The inspector could rationally conclude that the route was not a BOAT and was a bridleway.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review-style challenge under paragraph 12 of Schedule 15 to the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 against an inspector’s decision confirming, with modifications, a definitive map modification order. The inspector had held inquiries in December 2012 and March 2014 and maintained his conclusion that the route was a bridleway.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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