EAD Solicitors LLP v Garry Abrams Ltd

Under the Equality Act 2010, direct discrimination may be suffered by a natural or legal person because of another individual’s protected characteristic. The claimant need not possess, or be capable of possessing, the characteristic relied upon. The statutory language focuses on whether the claimant suffered detrimental treatment because of a protected characteristic, rather than on whether the claimant itself had that characteristic. The general statutory meaning of “person” includes a corporate body unless a contrary intention appears. The specific restriction of victimisation claims to individuals does not imply a corresponding restriction throughout the Act.

The Employment Judge, Ryan, determined as a preliminary issue that a limited company which was a member of an LLP could bring a direct age-discrimination complaint. The company had been established by Garry Abrams and was intended to provide his services to the LLP, although he had no continuing employment or worker relationship with it.

The LLP appealed, arguing that only an individual could possess a protected characteristic and therefore only an individual could complain of discrimination. The central issue was whether a corporate member could claim detriment caused by the age of an individual associated with it.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Judge was correct to hold that a corporation may complain of direct discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.
2. Section 13(1) provides that a person discriminates against another if, because of a protected characteristic, the first person treats the other less favourably than it treats or would treat others. Applying section 5 and Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978, “person” includes a body corporate unless a contrary intention appears. The LLP may therefore be the discriminator and the corporate member may be the person subjected to detriment.
3. The protected characteristic need not be that of the person suffering the detriment. The statutory link is between the detrimental treatment and a protected characteristic, not necessarily the claimant’s own characteristic. A legal person may accordingly suffer discrimination because of an individual’s age or another protected characteristic.
4. This interpretation was consistent with Showboat v Owens and Weathersfield v Sargent, where claimants lacking the relevant characteristic could complain of detriment caused by discriminatory treatment of others. The wording of the Equality Act 2010 was broader than the former wording considered in EBR Attridge Law LLP v Coleman.
5. The specific provision in section 27(4), limiting victimisation claims to individuals, did not restrict the meaning of “person” elsewhere in the Act. The comparable wording in Parts 4 and 7, and the treatment of contracts in Part 10, also gave no basis for confining claimants to natural persons.
6. Rolloswin Investments Ltd v Chromolit illustrated a contrary intention arising from statutory context, because a company could not perform the religious observance contemplated by the Sunday Observance Act 1677. No equivalent contrary intention appeared in the Equality Act.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: appeal dismissed; the Employment Judge’s preliminary ruling was upheld.
• Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge Ryan held that the corporate claimant could bring the discrimination complaint.