Pinard-Byrne v Lennox Linton

Reynolds privilege is a public-interest defence requiring an assessment of whether publication was responsible in all the circumstances. The public importance of an underlying project does not, by itself, justify publishing serious allegations of crime or professional misconduct. There must be a public interest in publishing the details of those allegations, supported by verification.

A publisher must investigate the specific wrongdoing alleged against the claimant and, ordinarily, put those allegations fairly to the claimant before publication. Failure to report allegations to the police or a professional body is relevant but is not invariably fatal. Appellate courts should respect a trial judge’s evaluation of the competing factors, particularly where the judge has seen the relevant witness.

Kieron Pinard-Byrne sued Lennox Linton over allegedly defamatory statements made during a radio broadcast and in an internet article concerning the Layou River project and economic citizenship programme. Cottle J found the statements defamatory, rejected fair comment and Reynolds privilege, and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court upheld the findings on defamation and fair comment but allowed the defendants’ appeals on qualified privilege. Pinard-Byrne appealed to the Privy Council, challenging only the rejection of the Reynolds privilege defence. The central issue was whether publication of the specific allegations against him was responsible and in the public interest.

The appeal was allowed. The Board held that the Court of Appeal had erred in allowing the appeal on Reynolds privilege.

1. The governing question was whether Lennox Linton, given what he knew and did not know and the steps he had taken to guard against publishing untrue defamatory material, could properly have considered publication to be in the public interest. The ten matters identified by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 remained relevant, with their weight varying according to the circumstances.

2. The Board rejected an approach focused only on the public interest in the underlying project. The allegations against Pinard-Byrne concerned criminal conduct and professional dishonesty. It was necessary to identify a public interest in publishing the details of those allegations, and verification was required to protect the individual concerned. The principle stated by Lord Dyson in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273 was applicable.

3. Linton had investigated the wider project, but there was no evidence that he had investigated whether Pinard-Byrne was guilty of the specific wrongdoing alleged. No adequate source or verification evidence was produced. The allegations were not shown to have been the subject of a respected investigation, there was no evidence of urgency, and the specific allegations were not put to Pinard-Byrne before publication. His ability to respond during the radio programme was insufficient.

4. Failure to complain to the police or the professional body was relevant, but the absence of such complaints was not an absolute bar to privilege. The question remained whether a responsible journalist had a duty to publish in all the circumstances.

5. The trial judge was entitled to assess Linton’s evidence and demeanour, and to find that the tone of the publications reflected animosity rather than even-handed reporting. In a case involving many factors, the Court of Appeal should not interfere unless the trial judge’s conclusion was wrong in principle or otherwise shown to be wrong. The judge’s overstatement concerning complaints to authorities was not critical. Linton had not acted responsibly in making the serious allegations.

Pinard-Byrne was entitled in principle to his costs. The parties were invited to make written submissions on costs and the form of the order.

1. Privy Council: Allowed Pinard-Byrne’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision on Reynolds privilege.
2. Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Commonwealth of Dominica): Allowed the defendants’ appeals on qualified privilege, while upholding the findings that the words were defamatory and that fair comment was unavailable.
3. Trial judge, Cottle J: Found the words defamatory, rejected the defences of fair comment and Reynolds privilege, and awarded damages.