AB v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Risk on return to Iran arising from internet activity requires an individual assessment. The evidence did not permit reliable country guidance on when blogging, Facebook activity or other online material would come to the attention of the Iranian authorities.

A high level of online activity is not required before persecution may occur. The decisive concern may arise at the pinch point of return, where a returnee is brought into contact with officials who may interrogate them, investigate internet activity and require access to online accounts. The risk increases with the returnee’s online activity, adverse profile and circumstances of return. Opportunistic online activity does not remove a risk if the authorities take an adverse interest in it.

Three Iranian nationals appealed decisions refusing them protection or removing them from the United Kingdom. Each relied principally on actual or perceived criticism of the Iranian state through blogging, Facebook, YouTube or related online activity.

AB’s appeal had been remitted by consent following an order of the Court of Appeal. CD’s and EF’s First-tier Tribunal decisions were set aside for legal error, including inadequate engagement with online material and country evidence. The Upper Tribunal heard the appeals together, received extensive expert and background evidence, and considered whether online activity and the circumstances of return created a real risk of persecution in Iran.

The common issue was whether, and in what circumstances, Iranian authorities could identify and act upon internet-based criticism by Iranian nationals, particularly on return from the United Kingdom.

1. The appeals were allowed. The Tribunal decided each appeal on its own merits and applied the low standard of a real risk of persecution or serious ill-treatment.

2. The evidence established that Iran regulates and polices internet use, can close or interfere with online accounts, and sometimes monitors activity outside Iran. It did not establish a reliable general basis for predicting when technically discoverable online activity would in fact be discovered or lead to persecution. The Tribunal therefore could not give country guidance on that issue.

3. It rejected the submission that only highly active or prominent online critics face risk. Greater activity may make official interest more likely, but low-level activity can still create danger once a person comes to the authorities’ attention. Conversely, the mere fact of blogging, using Facebook, spending time in the United Kingdom, or returning to Iran does not itself establish persecution risk.

4. The principal risk arose at the pinch point of return. A returnee who attracts official scrutiny may be interrogated about activities abroad and online activity. The Tribunal found it likely that such questioning could expose internet activity, including material critical of the Iranian government, and that exposure could create a real risk of persecution. A person cannot be expected to conceal relevant activity by lying.

5. The manner of return, a lapsed immigration status, use of special travel documents, prior profile and the extent of online activity may increase the likelihood and consequences of official interest. An extremely discreet person may avoid identification, but lapses in security and hostile interrogation may expose activity.

6. The appellants’ activities and circumstances, viewed individually, created the requisite real risk. The Tribunal also held that opportunistic or insincere online activity is not material to the risk assessment: if the Iranian authorities take an adverse interest, their concern is with the activity rather than the claimant’s motive.

• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Allowed the three appeals after remaking them.
• Court of Appeal: AB’s appeal was remitted by consent to the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration of the permitted grounds concerning blogging in the United Kingdom.
• First-tier Tribunal: The appeals had been dismissed. CD’s and EF’s decisions were set aside for legal error; AB’s earlier Upper Tribunal dismissal had been remitted following the Court of Appeal order.