Cameran Hamasour, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A supplementary decision letter can cure no defect in an earlier immigration decision unless it genuinely records or elucidates reasons already reached. The court must assess late reasons cautiously, particularly where they are produced after judicial-review proceedings have begun and concern European Convention on Human Rights rights.

Where the material shows that significant evidence was first considered only in the supplementary letter, that letter is a separate decision and a retrospective justification cannot validate the original decision. The operative date is the date of the completed, later decision. Judicial-review relief remains discretionary, and may be refused where the later decision provides an effective statutory appeal remedy.

The applicant, an Iraqi national who had lived in the United Kingdom since 1999, applied for leave to remain on private-life grounds under paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Secretary of State refused the application on 29 April 2014 without a right of appeal.

After permission for judicial review was granted, the Secretary of State issued a supplementary letter dated 18 May 2015. It purported to clarify the original reasons and addressed the applicant’s evidence about his residence, business, community connections and asserted lack of ties with Iraq.

The central issues were whether the original refusal had adequately considered the evidence, whether the supplementary letter formed part of the original decision, and whether the later letter affected the relief available in judicial review.

1. Claim dismissed. The original refusal decision was unlawful because it did not adequately, or at all, engage with much of the substantial material advanced in support of the private-life and exceptional-circumstances case. It asserted an absence of evidence of lost ties despite witness evidence and other material requiring consideration. Absent the later letter, the decision of 29 April 2014 would have been quashed.

2. Applying the cautious approach in Nash v Chelsea College of Art and Design [2001] EWHC Admin 538, the Tribunal held that the supplementary letter could not be treated as a continuation of the original decision. The case notes showed that proper consideration of the significant evidence occurred only after permission for judicial review had been granted. The reasons in the later letter were therefore a retrospective justification, rather than the original reasons.

3. The later letter was a separate decision, dated 18 May 2015. Even if the two letters had constituted one decision, its operative date could not precede the date on which the decision was completed by the later reasons.

4. The later decision sufficiently addressed the significant matters raised. It was not necessary for the Secretary of State to identify and answer every item of evidence. Its conclusions were open to her.

5. Relief in judicial review was discretionary. The later decision had, in practical terms, provided the applicant with the substance of the relief sought and an alternative statutory appeal route. Although it omitted notice of appeal rights, the applicant could waive service of proper notice and pursue that remedy, consistently with Khan, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 353 (IAC). The Tribunal therefore refused relief and dismissed the claim. It proposed no order for costs, subject to written submissions.

This was a first-instance judicial-review claim in the Upper Tribunal.

• Secretary of State: Refused the applicant’s private-life application on 29 April 2014. A supplementary decision letter was issued on 18 May 2015.
• Upper Tribunal: Held the original refusal unlawful, but dismissed the claim because the supplementary letter was a separate decision and an alternative statutory appeal remedy was available.