A & B (Children), Re

On an application for permission to appeal, a narrative account of events does not constitute a ground of appeal. The applicant must identify the findings or decisions challenged and provide material showing a reasonable prospect that the judge was wrong. Procedural or fair-trial complaints must be assessed against the evidence and the applicant’s position at the hearing. Peripheral, unsubstantiated complaints cannot support an appeal where the principal findings were accepted and remain largely unchallenged. An order removing children from parental care may interfere with family life, but is compatible with ECHR, Art 8 where the findings make it necessary and proportionate to protect the children. Permission was refused.

The applications arose from extensive fact-finding hearings in three related sets of care proceedings concerning six children. The High Court made full care orders for the two children of Mr and Mrs A and care orders, together with placement-for-adoption orders, for the three children of Miss B.

Mr and Mrs A and Miss B, appearing without legal representation and subject to confidentiality restrictions, sought permission to challenge the factual findings and certain procedural matters. The Court of Appeal arranged hearings and practical assistance to enable them to formulate their proposed grounds. The central question was whether the proposed challenges identified an arguable error with a reasonable prospect of success.

Permission to appeal was refused in both applications on all grounds.

1. Form of a permissible challenge. A proposed appeal must focus on what the first-instance judge decided. The applicant must identify the particular findings challenged and provide material showing a reasonable prospect of demonstrating error. A narrative account of past events, general disagreement with the judgment, or complaints unsupported by the hearing record is insufficient.
2. Mr and Mrs A. Their principal factual challenge did not engage with the scale of the findings. The findings were largely accepted during the first-instance proceedings and only two or three specific findings were identified as challenged. The procedural and fair-trial complaints were peripheral, unsubstantiated, and in any event could not affect the outcome against the background of the accepted findings. The proposed appeal therefore had no prospect of success.
3. Miss B. Her complaints concerning representation by the same children’s guardian, the absence of a residential assessment, and the timing of therapeutic work were answered by the evidence. No application for a separate guardian or residential placement had been made, no professional had recommended residential assessment, and the relevant work could not be undertaken until after the proceedings. The central finding was that her continuing relationships with known sexual abusers, together with her vulnerability and capacity for dishonesty and deception, made it unsafe to place the children in her care. None of the proposed grounds showed a realistic prospect that the judge had erred.
4. Family life. The orders interfered with the parties’ family-life arrangements, but were not contrary to ECHR, Art 8. In light of the findings of fact, the orders were necessary and proportionate to protect the children, whose welfare required paramount consideration throughout their lives.

Permission to appeal was accordingly refused to all three applicants.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 9 September 2016 refused permission to appeal to Mr and Mrs A and Miss B on all grounds; judgment explaining that decision was handed down on 9 November 2016.
• High Court, Family Division: Mrs Justice Theis conducted the fact-finding hearing and subsequently made full care orders for the children of Mr and Mrs A, and care orders with placement-for-adoption orders for Miss B’s children.