AA (USA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An appellate court should not second-guess a tribunal’s proportionality assessment. The relevant question is whether the tribunal made an error of law. A factual mistake is material only if it could have affected the reasoning or outcome. Recognition of family life between an adult child and a parent does not, without more, make removal disproportionate where adequate alternative care is available, even if the child provides better care. On a second appeal, the strength of the proposed case informs whether there is a compelling reason for permission. Where no fundamental or material error is shown, that requirement is not met.

The appellant, a United States citizen, applied for indefinite leave to remain on the basis that she cared for her mother. The Secretary of State refused the application. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that family life existed between the adult daughter and her mother, but found that refusal and removal would be proportionate because other family members could provide care, although of lesser quality.

The First-tier Tribunal misstated the date on which the appellant had entered the United Kingdom. The Upper Tribunal concluded that the error was immaterial and upheld the decision. The Court of Appeal considered whether the First-tier Tribunal had made a material error of law and whether there was a compelling reason to justify a second appeal.

1. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. The Court of Appeal held that the First-tier Tribunal had not made an error of law requiring its decision to be set aside.

2. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to recognise family life between an adult daughter and her mother. It was also entitled to conclude that refusal of leave was proportionate. The evidence showed that the mother could be cared for by her husband and son, although the quality of care would be better if the appellant remained. That benefit did not by itself make removal disproportionate.

3. The error concerning the appellant’s date of entry was not material. The proportionality assessment did not turn on whether she had arrived in 2011 or 2012. The findings about the mother’s care needs were unaffected, and the tribunal had also considered the appellant’s private life.

4. The Upper Tribunal was entitled to find that the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion was adequately reasoned. The Court of Appeal emphasised that it was not its role to second-guess the tribunals’ evaluative judgment. The issue was confined to whether an error of law had been made.

5. The second appeal requirement was also not satisfied. Whether there was a compelling reason depended on the strength of the proposed case. In the absence of the alleged fundamental error, there was no compelling reason independently justifying a full hearing.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for permission to appeal refused.
• Upper Tribunal: held that the First-tier Tribunal’s error concerning the appellant’s date of entry was immaterial and upheld its decision.
• First-tier Tribunal: accepted that family life existed but found refusal of indefinite leave to remain proportionate.