Crutchley v Kruger & Ors

Permission for a second appeal requires both a reasonable prospect of success and an important point of practice or principle, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to intervene. The court will not reopen an interlocutory costs decision merely because the lower court was given an inaccurate account of the procedural history, where the underlying application was justified and the relevant order remained appropriate. An order for immediate interim costs payment is ordinarily appropriate after a party loses an interlocutory application, absent particular circumstances such as inability to pay. Appellate interference with a costs discretion requires a decision outside the permissible margin.

The claimant sustained serious injuries in a road accident and brought long-running personal injury proceedings. After the original trial was aborted, the defendants sought further disclosure while the claimant was acting in person. A Deputy Master ordered further disclosure and required the claimant to pay £4,000 in interim costs. Following non-payment, the action was struck out.

The claimant appealed. Knowles J dismissed the appeal, accepting that the defendants had given a misleading account of the disclosure history but holding that disclosure remained outstanding and that the costs order was proper. The claimant sought permission for a second appeal, challenging the disclosure order, the costs decisions and the treatment of his status as a litigant in person.

1. Permission refused. The proposed appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and raised no important point of practice or principle, nor any other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to entertain a second appeal.
2. The claimant had declined to agree to further disclosure. The defendants were therefore justified in applying for an order compelling disclosure. The application succeeded because disclosure remained outstanding, even though the defendants had inaccurately presented the earlier disclosure history.
3. The ordinary consequence of losing an interlocutory application of this kind was an order for costs. The costs order was not imposed as a penalty for the defendants’ unwarranted portrayal of the claimant as a disclosure culprit. The claimant had explained his previous co-operation to the Deputy Master, but that did not alter the ordinary outcome.
4. Under the prevailing approach of the Civil Procedure Rules, an interim requirement to pay costs immediately ordinarily accompanied such an order. Departure required particular circumstances, such as inability to pay. No such issue had been raised before the lower courts or on the proposed appeal.
5. Costs decisions involved a wide discretion. An appeal could succeed only if the judge acted outside the permissible margin. Knowles J had made a careful assessment, and the proposed grounds did not disclose any such error. The claimant’s status as a litigant in person and the serious consequences of striking out did not justify a different conclusion.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Tomlinson LJ refused permission for a second appeal. On oral renewal, McFarlane LJ upheld that refusal.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Knowles J dismissed the claimant’s appeal against the orders leading to the striking out of the action.
3. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Deputy Master Eyre ordered further disclosure and payment of £4,000 in interim costs. Following non-payment, the action was struck out.
4. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Singh J granted permission to appeal from the striking-out outcome.