Randall v Randall

For the purpose of the Civil Procedure Rules rule 57.7, an interest in an estate is a procedural standing requirement. It is not confined to a legal entitlement to administer or share in the estate. It can include a real financial interest in the validity of a will. A creditor of a beneficiary may therefore bring a probate claim where the beneficiary’s receipt under the will affects the creditor’s entitlement. A creditor of the estate remains in a different position and lacks sufficient interest to challenge the will. The rule must be interpreted consistently with the overriding objective and justice. Supervisory powers to recall a grant do not necessarily provide an adequate alternative route.

Following their divorce, H and W agreed in a consent order that, if W inherited more than £100,000 from her mother, she would retain £100,000 and share the balance equally with H. W’s mother’s will left £100,000 to W and the residue to W’s children. H alleged that the will was invalid under section 9 of the Wills Act 1837. On the assumed lack of due execution, H would receive an estimated £75,000 if the will failed.

In Chancery Division claim HC13C04634, the Deputy Master decided as a preliminary issue that H lacked a sufficient interest under CPR 57.7 to bring a probate claim. H appealed with permission. The central issue was whether a creditor of a beneficiary has an interest in the estate sufficient to challenge the will.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed unanimously. The Master of the Rolls held that H had a sufficient interest to bring the probate claim because the validity of the will directly affected whether W would receive the inheritance from which H’s entitlement could be satisfied.
2. Meaning of interest. CPR 57.7 is a procedural requirement. It should be construed broadly enough to include a real financial interest in the will’s validity. The court rejected confinement of the requirement to personal representatives, persons entitled to a grant, or persons entitled to distribution. The historical authorities supported this approach, including Kipping and Barlow v Ash (1845) 1 Rob 270, Dixon and Dickenson v Allinson (1864) Tr and Sw 572, and The Goods of Timothy White, deceased (1893) LR Ir 31.
3. Creditor distinction. Menzies v Pulbrook and Kerr (1841) 2 Curt 846 remains good law for the proposition that a creditor of the deceased’s estate lacks sufficient interest to challenge the will. That creditor is concerned with administration, whereas a creditor of a beneficiary is concerned with the beneficiary receiving the testamentary entitlement. The two positions are fundamentally different. The court approved the broad reasoning in O’Brien v Seagrave [2007] EWHC 788 (Ch).
4. Procedure and justice. The power under section 121 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not provide an adequate alternative route, since denying standing would prevent the issue reaching the court. Whether a claim is good is substantive; whether it may be brought is procedural. The CPR’s overriding objective supported an interpretation allowing H to challenge the will.
5. Lord Justice McCombe agreed, adding that the historical categories of persons entitled to require proof of a will were illustrative rather than exhaustive. Lady Justice King agreed and emphasised the settlement context and the practical injustice that could result if the undertaking could not be enforced through the probate claim.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal and held that the appellant had sufficient interest to bring the probate claim.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: The Deputy Master determined the preliminary issue in claim HC13C04634 and held that the appellant lacked sufficient interest and standing.