Lee v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

A Secretary of State determining a planning appeal need not reproduce every detail of an inspector’s report. It is sufficient that the decision letter addresses the material findings and required balancing exercise. An omitted detail need not be expressly repeated where it is necessarily apparent from the underlying facts. Thus, where the likelihood of relocation to another unauthorised site is accepted, the decision-maker need not state expressly that the site will be in the Green Belt. A fact-specific authority concerning failure to make any finding about the likelihood of roadside camping does not govern a case where that likelihood has been accepted.

The appellant, a Romani Gypsy, sought permission to retain a residential mobile home and associated structures on land in the Green Belt. Runnymede Borough Council refused permission and issued an enforcement notice. The Inspector recommended that the notice be quashed and that temporary permission be granted, but the Secretary of State dismissed the planning appeal and extended the compliance period from nine to 18 months.

The appellant challenged the decisions under sections 288 and 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Lewis J rejected the application and dismissed the appeal. The appellant argued that the Secretary of State had failed to account for the likely environmental harm if the family moved to another unauthorised Green Belt site, and that the judge had failed to address that point. The central issue was whether the decision letter had to refer expressly to the alternative site being in the Green Belt.

Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Simon gave the leading judgment. Lord Justices Lindblom and Jackson agreed.

1. The Inspector treated the main issue as whether material considerations clearly outweighed the harm to the Green Belt and any other harm, so as to establish very special circumstances. The assessment included pitch need, alternative provision, personal circumstances and human-rights considerations.
2. The Inspector found that refusal was likely to result in the family moving to another unauthorised site, with consequences for the daughter’s health and the children’s education. The Secretary of State accepted those findings, but concluded that, even when combined with the occupants’ personal circumstances and the children’s needs, very special circumstances did not arise.
3. Moore v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWCA Civ 1194 was fact-specific. It concerned an inspector’s failure to make any finding about the likelihood of roadside camping if temporary permission were refused. That error did not arise here because the Secretary of State had accepted the relevant likelihood.
4. The Secretary of State was not required to repeat every word of the Inspector’s report or expressly state that the alternative unauthorised site would be in the Green Belt. In the context of the underlying facts, that location was necessarily apparent to informed readers of the decision letter. The decision letter therefore adequately addressed the material issue, and Lewis J had dealt with the appellant’s argument sufficiently.
5. The family’s likely relocation and its effects on health and education were relevant to the Article 8 proportionality assessment, but did not compel permission. The refusal pursued a legitimate and important aim and the judgment below disclosed no error of law.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal from Lewis J’s decision.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Planning Court): Lewis J rejected the application under section 288 and dismissed the appeal under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.