PT (Sri Lanka) v Entry Clearance Officer, Chennai

There is no legal or factual presumption that family life under article 8 exists, or does not exist, between an adult child and the child’s parents or siblings. The inquiry is fact-sensitive. Love, affection and ordinary emotional ties are insufficient by themselves, but a young adult who remains single and lives with the family will normally enjoy protected family life.

Article 8 gives adult children no general right to join relatives in their country of residence. Proportionality depends on the individual circumstances, including the adult child’s capacity for independent life and any genuine choices available to the family. An appellate court should respect a tribunal’s fact-sensitive assessment unless it misunderstands the law or reaches a plainly wrong conclusion.

The appellant was a Sri Lankan national who applied at age 20 for entry clearance to join his father in the United Kingdom. His mother and two younger sisters applied at the same time and received entry clearance, leaving him in Sri Lanka. The Entry Clearance Officer refused his application.

The First-tier Tribunal rejected his claim under paragraph 317 of the Immigration Rules. It also found that his relationship with his parents and siblings did not constitute family life protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Alternatively, it found the refusal proportionate. The Upper Tribunal dismissed his appeal.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the tribunals had applied an unduly restrictive approach to family life between an adult child and close relatives and, if article 8 was engaged, whether the refusal of entry clearance was nevertheless proportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s finding that the appellant had no protected family life with his mother and sisters was unsustainable. Nevertheless, its alternative conclusion that refusing entry clearance was a proportionate interference was legally open to it. The Upper Tribunal therefore made no error of law in dismissing the appeal.

2. There is no presumption for or against the existence of family life between adult children and their parents or siblings. The question is highly fact-sensitive. Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 had not been disapproved, but required interpretation in light of the later authorities summarised in Ghising v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKUT 00160 (IAT). Love, affection and blood ties alone are insufficient. There must be something more, but no exceptional dependency is required.

3. A young adult who lives with parents or siblings and has not founded an independent family will normally enjoy family life protected by article 8. On the available evidence, the appellant was a single student who had lived continuously with his family, remained financially dependent and had attained adulthood less than two years earlier. Those circumstances went beyond ordinary emotional ties. The First-tier Tribunal was therefore not entitled to find that article 8 was unengaged.

4. The First-tier Tribunal could nevertheless use its substantially overlapping findings under paragraph 317 of the Immigration Rules when assessing proportionality. Those findings showed that the appellant could make the transition to independent adult life, despite continuing financial dependence. There was no evidence of any special impact arising from separation. Refusal was therefore proportionate to the legitimate interest in maintaining a consistent system of immigration control.

5. Article 8 does not give adult children an invariable right to join parents or siblings in another country. The availability of a genuine, although difficult, family choice was also material: the mother and sisters chose to move to the United Kingdom, while the father could have returned to Sri Lanka. Such cases require individual assessment without bright-line rules. Appellate intervention is justified only where the tribunal misunderstands the law or reaches a plainly wrong assessment.

Underhill LJ delivered the judgment. Cranston J and Beatson LJ agreed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the appeal. It held that the First-tier Tribunal’s finding on the existence of family life was unsustainable, but upheld its alternative proportionality assessment and concluded that the Upper Tribunal had made no error of law.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Dismissed the appeal from the First-tier Tribunal, holding that no material error of law had been established.
3. First-tier Tribunal: Dismissed the appeal under paragraph 317 of the Immigration Rules and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It found that protected family life was not established and, alternatively, that refusal of entry clearance was proportionate.