London Borough of Tower Hamlets v London Borough of Bromley

Conversion of a chattel requires conduct amounting to a deprivation of possession inconsistent with the owner's rights; mere disturbance is trespass. The court must assess all the circumstances. Public authorities receive no special exemption from ordinary limitation principles. Removal, restoration, lending to a third party, control over the chattel and assuming responsibility for it may demonstrate dominion inconsistent with another person's title, even where the authority genuinely believes that it owns the chattel. Where the first-instance findings support that conclusion and the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success, permission to appeal should be refused.

Tower Hamlets brought proceedings concerning ownership of a Henry Moore sculpture acquired by the London County Council in 1962. Following statutory changes affecting London local government, Bromley claimed title as successor to the London Residuary Body. Norris J declared that the sculpture belonged to Tower Hamlets in a judgment dated 8 July 2015, cited as [2015] EWCA 2217 (Chancery). Bromley sought renewed permission to appeal. The dispute concerned whether Tower Hamlets' conduct between 1997 and 2002 amounted to conversion, thereby extinguishing Bromley's right to recover the sculpture under the Limitation Act 1990, and whether the public interest justified a different approach.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Conversion involves deprivation of possession to an extent inconsistent with the owner's rights, whereas trespass includes lesser interference. McCombe LJ referred to the formulation in Sanderson v Marsden (1922) 10 Lloyd's List Reports 467 at 472. He considered it unnecessary to determine every principle identified by the first-instance judge, beyond the proposition that an assertion of dominion inconsistent with the owner's rights may constitute conversion.
2. The dispute raised no special public-interest issue. Although the fact that the parties were local authorities formed part of the circumstances, there was no compelling reason to treat the case differently from an ordinary chattel-conversion claim. Limitation law applies to public authorities as it does to private persons.
3. Tower Hamlets had treated the sculpture as its own. Its conduct included removing it after demolition works, lending it to the Yorkshire Sculpture Park for three years, arranging restoration, controlling the work undertaken, dealing with insurance and deliberately leaving it away from Tower Hamlets. Those acts went beyond safeguarding or temporary removal and were inconsistent with Bromley's title.
4. McCombe LJ agreed with Kitchin LJ's earlier assessment that the judge had directed himself properly and was entitled to find a series of acts inconsistent with Bromley's ownership rights. The proposed appeal therefore had no real prospect of success.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 19 May 2016, McCombe LJ refused Bromley's renewed application for permission to appeal.
• High Court (Chancery Division): Norris J declared on 8 July 2015 that the sculpture belonged to Tower Hamlets. The decision is cited in the judgment as [2015] EWCA 2217 (Chancery).