FA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an asylum claim by a Pakistani Ahmadi, the decision-maker must use the country guidance in MN as a framework for assessing both risk on return and internal relocation. The assessment turns on how the claimant genuinely wishes or feels impelled to manifest his faith. Public profession, preaching or attempts to convert may create a significant risk, whereas private practice generally presents a different risk. Internal relocation cannot be assessed separately from the claimant’s mode of religious practice. Failure to engage with relevant country guidance may be a material error of law. Where the claimant practises discreetly and there is no evidence that the persecutor can track him throughout the country, relocation may be safe and not unduly harsh.

The appellant, a Pakistani Ahmadi, claimed asylum after receiving threats from Khatme-e-Nubuwat following his return from the United Kingdom. The First-tier Tribunal accepted his account and found that internal relocation was unavailable, allowing the appeal. The Upper Tribunal held that the First-tier Tribunal had failed adequately to engage with the country guidance in MN, set aside its decision, remade the decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal considered whether that failure was a material error of law and whether relocation to another part of Pakistan was safe and not unduly harsh.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Upper Tribunal was entitled to set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision because it had failed to address the material country guidance in MN and Others (Ahmadis – country conditions – risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 389 (IAC).
2. Country guidance. MN provides a framework for assessing Pakistani Ahmadi asylum claims. The relevant distinction is between those who feel impelled to manifest their faith openly, including by preaching, seeking converts or open discussion, and those content to practise privately. The extent and nature of the claimant’s religious practice are relevant to both persecution risk and internal relocation.
3. Material error of law. The risk of persecution on return cannot be divorced from the question of internal relocation, and relocation cannot be assessed without considering how the claimant chooses to practise his faith. The First-tier Tribunal could not properly determine relocation without addressing the findings in MN. The error was potentially outcome-determinative and therefore material.
4. Application to the appellant. The Upper Tribunal was entitled to find that the appellant practised his faith discreetly and was unlikely to attract KN’s attention outside his home area. There was no finding that KN had the will or means to track individual Ahmadis throughout Pakistan. Relocation to another part of Pakistan where the appellant was not known could therefore be safe and would not be unduly harsh.
5. The principle in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 A.C. 596, that a person cannot be expected to conceal an essential aspect of identity to avoid persecution applies to Ahmadis who feel impelled to practise their faith publicly. That principle is reflected in MN.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. The court held that the First-tier Tribunal’s failure to engage with MN was a material error of law and upheld the Upper Tribunal’s conclusion on internal relocation.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s treatment of MN, set aside its decision, remade the decision and dismissed the appeal.
• First-tier Tribunal: Accepted the appellant’s account, found internal relocation unavailable and allowed the appeal.