Hyde & Ors, R v

A Single Judge may grant leave to appeal against sentence on specified grounds only, or in relation to a specified part of the sentence. Section 11(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 prevents successive challenges to sentences imposed in the same proceeding; it does not require general leave.

Whether leave should be limited or general depends on the Single Judge’s evaluation. Discrete grounds may properly be filtered. Where grounds overlap or raise totality, general leave may be more practical. The decision must state unambiguously whether leave is general or limited. Grounds refused by the Single Judge, and new grounds formulated later, require leave from the Full Court.

Nine applications and appeals against sentence from Crown Courts were listed together to resolve a procedural question which had produced differing practice. The central issue was whether a Single Judge considering an application for leave to appeal against sentence could grant leave on arguable grounds while refusing leave on others.

The court also determined the individual matters. They included credit for guilty pleas, correction of unlawful sentencing terminology and extradition-custody credit, a sexual offences prevention order imposed with an indeterminate sentence, a Bail Act sentence, dangerousness, suspended-sentence activation, driving disqualification, and qualifying-curfew credit.

1. The court held that a Single Judge may grant limited leave. Section 11(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 bars multiple or successive appeals against sentences imposed in the same proceeding. It does not restrict the power under section 31 to grant leave on limited grounds or against part of a sentence. The court followed Cox & Thomas, [1999] 2 CAR 6.

2. The choice between limited and general leave is for the Single Judge. Limited leave is appropriate where grounds are genuinely discrete, including where an unlawful technical element requires correction but cannot affect overall totality. General leave may be preferable where the grounds overlap or cumulatively raise totality. The Form SJ must state the scope of leave clearly. Refused grounds must be renewed before the Full Court, and a ground formulated after the Single Judge’s decision also needs the Full Court’s leave.

3. A Bail Act sentence carries an appeal as of right, but its presence within an overall Crown Court sentence does not require leave on every other ground. A very lengthy extension-of-time application which may merit argument should ordinarily be referred to the Full Court rather than determined by granting leave on paper.

4. The individual outcomes reflected those principles. Hyde’s substantive appeal was dismissed, but his sentence was corrected to record 35 days in extradition custody. The appeals of Jesuthasan and Haywood were dismissed. Stokes’s and McGinley’s sentences were reduced to 36 and 42 months respectively, and Williams’s total sentence was reduced from six years to four years and three months plus three months consecutive.

5. Collins’s sexual offences prevention order was quashed because it was not necessary alongside his indeterminate sentence. Henry’s unlawful term of imprisonment was substituted with detention in a young offenders’ institution; his other renewed grounds were refused. Hussain’s disqualification orders were corrected, his suspended sentence was activated for five rather than ten months, and 61 days of qualifying-curfew credit were ordered. His total term was reduced from 22 to 17 months.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Determined nine linked sentence appeals and applications, and gave procedural guidance on limited leave to appeal.
• Crown Court: The underlying sentencing decisions were made in several Crown Courts. No lower-court neutral citations were stated in the judgment.