Tucker, R v

An ordinary article is an offensive weapon under section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 only if it is carried with an intention to cause injury. The required intention must exist before the article is carried in the public place. A person who deliberately takes an article from private premises into a public place intending to use it in violence commits the offence, even if its violent use follows promptly.

An alleged breach of Code D does not require exclusion of recognition evidence under section 78 where the trial remains fair. The court must consider the nature of the alleged breach, the available material for testing the recognition evidence, and the adequacy of the jury directions.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Cambridge of affray, possessing an offensive weapon and assault by beating. The convictions arose from an affray in Soham during which a man carrying a cricket bat struck another participant.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant had brought the bat from his nearby flat and used it with intent to injure. Two police officers later recognised him after viewing CCTV footage and conducting door-to-door enquiries. A distinctive T-shirt matching that worn by the man with the bat was recovered from his flat.

He appealed the offensive-weapon conviction on the basis that there was no case to answer. He also sought renewed leave to challenge the admission of the officers’ identification evidence, alleging a breach of Code D and unfairness under section 78.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge correctly rejected the submission of no case to answer on the offensive-weapon count. A cricket bat is not inherently an offensive weapon, but it becomes one if carried with an intention to cause injury.

2. The evidence permitted the inference that the appellant formed that intention while in his flat, took the bat into the street, and then used it in the nearby affray. This was materially different from a person who is already lawfully carrying an ordinary article in a public place and, in the heat of an altercation, uses it as a weapon. The appellant had deliberately introduced the bat into a public place with the requisite intent, bringing the case within section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.

3. The judge’s directions required the jury to be sure that the appellant carried the bat after forming an intention to use it to cause injury. Since the defence was that he was not the man shown on the footage, rather than that he had carried the bat innocently, there was no tenable complaint about the direction.

4. The court refused renewed leave on identification. Neither paragraph D3.34 nor paragraph D3.2 of Code D fitted the unusual circumstances neatly. Even assuming a breach on a broad reading of Code D, exclusion under section 78 was not required. The jury saw the CCTV footage and photographs of the occupants, and received careful directions on the risks of recognition evidence, including the possibility of confirmation bias.

5. The alleged lack of a contemporaneous record did not render the trial unfair. The judge was entitled to leave the reliability and integrity of the officers’ recognition evidence for the jury, with the safeguards provided by those directions.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against conviction for possessing an offensive weapon and refused renewed leave to challenge the admission of identification evidence.

• Crown Court at Cambridge: On 29 June 2015, convicted the appellant of affray, possessing an offensive weapon and assault by beating. Sentence had been postponed.