Adgyei, R. v

A summary-only offence may be included in an indictment only where the statutory jurisdictional conditions are met. The fact that it arises from the same incident as an indictable offence does not suffice if it is not one of the summary offences specified by Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 40(3).

Jurisdiction is not a matter of discretion. A jury conviction obtained without jurisdiction must be quashed. Where a summary-only charge has been sent to the Crown Court, that court may deal with it following a guilty plea. Once the defendant pleads not guilty, however, paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 removes the Crown Court's power to determine it, and a contested charge must be returned to the magistrates' court for trial.

The appellant was tried in the Crown Court at Harrow on a charge of possessing a bladed article and, following an unopposed amendment to the indictment, a charge of resisting a police constable in the execution of duty contrary to section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996.

The jury acquitted him of the bladed-article charge but convicted him of the summary-only resisting charge. After trial, the judge certified that the jury had lacked jurisdiction to determine that charge. The appeal came before the Court of Appeal under section 1(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

The central issue was whether the summary-only offence could lawfully be tried by jury on the indictment and, if not, what should follow.

1. Appeal allowed. The conviction for resisting a police constable was quashed because the jury had no jurisdiction to consider that summary-only offence.

2. Section 40(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 permits certain summary offences to be included in an indictment where the statutory connection with an indictable offence is established. The provision is confined to the offences listed in that subsection. Resisting a police constable in the execution of duty is not listed. Its connection with the bladed-article allegation could not cure that omission.

3. The limitation was jurisdictional, not discretionary. Although the charge had properly been sent to the Crown Court under section 51(3) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, it could not lawfully be added to the indictment or left for the jury.

4. Further, under paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 to the 1998 Act, the Crown Court ceased to have power to deal with the summary-only charge once the appellant pleaded not guilty. A guilty plea would have permitted the Crown Court judge to sentence him. A contested charge had instead to be tried in the magistrates' court.

5. The charge was remitted to Harrow Crown Court for the appellant to plead. If he pleaded guilty, the judge could sentence him. If he pleaded not guilty, the charge was to be sent back to the Magistrates' Court for trial. Unconditional bail was granted.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): allowed the appeal under section 1(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, quashed the conviction, and remitted the summary-only charge to the Crown Court for a plea.

• Crown Court at Harrow: the appellant was acquitted by a jury of possessing a bladed article but convicted of resisting a police constable. The trial judge subsequently certified the jurisdictional point which led to the appeal.