McDonald, R. v

A trial judge should leave the partial defence of loss of control to the jury only where a rigorous evaluation identifies sufficient evidence on each statutory component. The judge must not reject evidence merely because a jury might accept it. However, the evidence must be capable of establishing a qualifying trigger and a reaction that a person with normal tolerance and self-restraint might have made.

Under Coroners and Justice Act 2009, conditional threats dependent on a future court decision, assessed with their full background, may fail to amount to circumstances of an extremely grave character or give a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. A reasoned trial ruling applying those principles will not readily be disturbed on appeal.

The appellant killed his estranged wife after a meeting concerning their financial settlement and their children. He accepted manslaughter but sought to rely on the partial defence of loss of control to murder. He alleged that the deceased threatened to prevent contact with the children, bankrupt him and make his mother homeless unless he accepted her financial proposal.

At the Crown Court at Exeter, the judge withdrew the defence after hearing the prosecution case and the appellant’s evidence. The appellant then pleaded guilty to murder and received life imprisonment with a minimum term of just under 17 years. He appealed against conviction, contending that the defence under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 should have been left to the jury.

Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to withdraw the partial defence of loss of control from the jury.

1. The statutory defence requires sufficient evidence that the killing resulted from loss of control, that there was a qualifying trigger, and that a person of the defendant’s age and sex with normal tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted in the same or a similar way. The judge must rigorously assess the evidence against those components, while allowing for evidence which a jury might accept.

2. Taking the case at its highest for the appellant, the alleged threats were insufficient to satisfy the qualifying-trigger limb in section 55(4). They were conditional upon the deceased persuading a court to act in her favour. Viewed with the history of the relationship and the appellant’s access to legal advice, they did not amount to circumstances of an extremely grave character and did not give him a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.

3. There was also no sufficient evidential basis on which a properly directed jury could conclude that a person with normal tolerance and self-restraint might have acted similarly. The judge had heard the appellant’s evidence, gave a reasoned ruling, and was entitled to regard his account and its asserted effect on him as unconvincing.

4. The court applied the appellate approach stated in Gurpinar [2015] EWCA Crim 178. Where a trial judge has rigorously evaluated the statutory components and explained the ruling, the appellate court will afford an appropriate ambit of judgment and will not readily interfere. Those conditions were met here.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
• Crown Court at Exeter. The trial judge ruled that the loss-of-control defence should not be left to the jury. The appellant then pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of just under 17 years.