Lewinson v R.

In unlawful act manslaughter, sentence must reflect both culpability and harm. Culpability includes the harm intended and the extent to which the fatal harm was foreseeable. Death is the highest level of harm and carries particular weight.

Where a young offender has planned violence, uses a fearsome weapon, intends injury, and fatal consequences are plainly foreseeable, culpability may be at or near the highest level for manslaughter. A life sentence for a dangerous offender may therefore be justified. However, the reduction from an adult sentence must properly reflect the offender’s age, maturity and capacity to change.

The appellant, aged 16 at the time of the offence, was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of manslaughter after a jury was not sure that he had the intent required for murder. He had pursued the 17-year-old victim and stabbed him in the chest with a large knife, causing his death.

The sentencing judge found the appellant dangerous and imposed detention for life. He specified a nine-year minimum term, based on a notional determinate sentence of 18 years. The appellant challenged the dangerousness finding, the life sentence, and the length of the notional term.

The central issues were whether detention for life was justified and whether sufficient allowance had been made for the appellant’s youth.

1. The appeal was allowed to a limited extent. The court upheld the finding of dangerousness and the sentence of detention for life under Criminal Justice Act 2003, but reduced the minimum term.

2. Following the sentencing approach in R v Huggins, Clarke and Gordon [2016] EWCA Crim. 1715, seriousness in unlawful act manslaughter depends principally on culpability and harm. Culpability reflects both the harm intended and the foreseeable harm actually caused. Death is the highest level of harm and must carry substantial weight.

3. The appellant’s culpability was at, or approached, the highest level for involuntary manslaughter. The violence was planned. He acquired and carried a fearsome weapon, deliberately attacked the victim, and intended harm. Although the jury’s verdict excluded an intent to kill or cause really serious harm, fatal consequences were a real and entirely foreseeable possibility. His subsequent efforts to conceal his involvement and evade arrest reinforced the seriousness of the offending.

4. The judge was entitled to conclude that the offence lay at the very top of the manslaughter range and was very close to murder in culpability and harm. The judge was also entitled, on his own assessment of the offence and the appellant’s character, to find him dangerous. Given that finding and the seriousness of the offence, section 226 required detention for life.

5. An adult notional determinate term of 24 years was not manifestly excessive. But the 25% reduction to 18 years did not sufficiently reflect that the appellant was only 16 and was not shown to be unusually mature or sophisticated. The appropriate notional term was two thirds of the adult term, namely 16 years. The statutory minimum term was therefore eight years less 333 days on remand, producing a specified minimum term of seven years and 32 days from 13 May 2016.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the sentence appeal only insofar as the minimum term was excessive. The detention-for-life sentence and dangerousness finding were upheld.
• Central Criminal Court: The appellant was convicted of manslaughter on 1 April 2016. On 13 May 2016, the judge imposed detention for life and specified a nine-year minimum term under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.