Holloway, R. v.

A defendant who is fit to stand trial may dismiss legal representatives and conduct the defence personally. Mental illness does not, without a proper factual and legal basis, empower the court to impose representation or require a stay.

Absent statutory authority, a court cannot appoint an advocate to perform the role of defence counsel for a defendant who has refused representation. The court may appoint an intermediary to facilitate effective participation, but that is a distinct role. An irregular appointment will not render a conviction unsafe unless it caused unfairness or prejudice.

A defence of necessity or duress by circumstances requires objective necessity. A desire to publicise grievances concerning psychiatric detention cannot justify violence where lawful review procedures are available.

The applicant, who had longstanding mental health difficulties and was detained under the Mental Health Act 1973, attacked his treating psychiatrist with a homemade weapon. He was charged with attempted murder and wounding with intent. Although found fit to stand trial, he dismissed his lawyers and represented himself, with a barrister appointed by the judge to assist the court and, in practice, to assist him.

A jury convicted him of wounding with intent and acquitted him of attempted murder. The trial judge imposed life imprisonment with a hospital and limitation direction under the Mental Health Act 1983, with a five-year minimum term.

The applicant sought extensions of time and leave to appeal conviction and sentence. The principal issue was whether the judge had power to appoint an advocate where a fit defendant had elected self-representation, and whether the resulting procedure rendered the conviction unsafe.

1. The court dismissed the appeal against conviction. It was prepared to grant leave on the ground concerning the court-appointed advocate, but held that the conviction was safe. It refused leave to appeal against sentence.

2. The applicant had been certified fit to stand trial. He was entitled to represent himself, and the judge had no power to force professional representation upon him. There was no factual or legal basis to stay the proceedings. The trial judge had ensured that the applicant could present the defence he wished to advance, and the applicant had been acquitted of the more serious count.

3. There was no evidential basis for leaving necessity or duress of circumstances to the jury. The applicant's belief that an assault or hostage-taking would draw attention to his detention and family concerns could not amount to an objectively necessary response to a threat of death or serious injury. Lawful mental-health review procedures were available.

4. The counts on the indictment, together with the alternative verdict of unlawful wounding, gave the jury a fair opportunity to determine whether the injury was deliberate and, if so, the applicant's intent. No additional alternative counts were required. Conversations between the applicant and a treating psychiatrist after the incident were not interviews governed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The evidence was potentially admissible and probative of motive and reaction, and there was no basis for exclusion.

5. The judge had no power, save where statute provides, to appoint an advocate to act as a defence advocate and adviser after a fit defendant had rejected representation. An intermediary may be appointed to facilitate a vulnerable defendant's participation, but that distinct power did not justify the appointment made here. The irregularity caused no prejudice: the applicant conducted the key parts of his case, the issues were narrow, and the barrister's assistance was beneficial. Looking at the trial as a whole, it was fair.

6. The life sentence, hospital and limitation direction, and five-year minimum term were neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. The offence was planned, involved an intention to cause really serious harm, and the applicant presented an inevitable finding of dangerousness.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court held that the appointment of a court advocate was unauthorised but did not render the conviction unsafe. The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was refused.

2. Trial court: On 29 September 2014, the jury convicted the applicant of wounding with intent and acquitted him of attempted murder. On 1 December 2014, the judge imposed life imprisonment with a hospital and limitation direction under the Mental Health Act 1983, with a five-year minimum term.