Spitalfields Historic Trust Ltd, R (on the application of) v Mayor of London & Ors

Intervention by the Mayor of London under article 7 of the Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2008 is lawful where the development is capable of significantly affecting implementation of the London Plan, has significant effects beyond the local borough, and there are sound planning reasons for intervention. Significance is a matter of planning judgment. A small contribution to an overall supply figure does not prevent an individual development from having significant strategic importance. A contribution to Crossrail may be material, but it does not itself demonstrate significant impact on implementation where the project would proceed without it. The court must refuse judicial review relief where it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different absent the complained-of conduct.

British Land Property Management Ltd applied for planning permission and listed building consent for a substantial mixed-use development at Norton Folgate, Tower Hamlets. The local planning authority resolved to refuse both applications on housing and heritage grounds. The Mayor then directed under article 7 of the Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2008 that he would act as local planning authority, relying on the development’s strategic economic, transport and cross-boundary effects.

The claimant sought judicial review, alleging failure to consider its representations, misinterpretation and inadequate reasoning concerning article 7, and apparent pre-judgment by a GLA officer. The issues were whether the article 7 criteria were satisfied and whether any procedural errors justified relief.

1. Application dismissed. The Mayor’s report was thorough and properly addressed the material planning considerations.
2. Article 7 required consideration of whether the development would significantly affect implementation of the spatial development strategy, have significant effects on more than one borough, and provide sound planning reasons for intervention. These were matters of planning judgment. The proposed office-led development had a sufficiently significant relationship with the City Fringe and Central Activities Zone to satisfy the first criterion. Its small percentage of the overall London office-space target did not determine the issue.
3. The Crossrail contribution was capable of being a material planning consideration under London Plan policy 6.5. However, because Crossrail was already under construction and would proceed without the contribution, the payment could not itself constitute a significant impact on implementation of the London Plan. This error was immaterial because the employment and policy considerations independently satisfied the criterion.
4. The site’s proximity to the City of London and Hackney, its role in a cross-borough economic cluster, and the relationship between the City Fringe and the Central Activities Zone provided ample grounds for finding significant effects on more than one borough. The absence of representations from neighbouring boroughs did not compel a different conclusion.
5. The claimant’s letter had not been accurately described in the report. Nevertheless, the substantive objections relevant to the article 7 criteria had been addressed, and it was highly unlikely that consideration of the letter would have produced a substantially different outcome.
6. The GLA officer’s email indicating the intended recommendation was unwise, but the final report was balanced and comprehensive. R (Wm Morrison Supermarkets Ltd) v Teesside Development Corporation [1998] JPL 23 concerned materially different facts involving a development corporation’s promotional and planning functions. The principle against surrendering independent judgment did not invalidate the present decision.
7. Under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as amended, relief had to be refused because the outcome would highly likely have been the same.

This was a first-instance judicial review. After the Mayor resolved to grant permission subject to a section 106 obligation, the Secretary of State declined to call in the application under section 77 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The High Court dismissed the claim.