Singhal UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

A planning condition restricting a building to specified purposes and stating that it may be used for no other purpose can exclude permitted development rights, even without expressly mentioning the relevant order. The condition must be construed in its context, and the court should not look behind its wording to the reason given for imposing it.

In a written-representation planning appeal, an inspector must address the main arguments advanced. The inspector is not required to search the papers for contingent or hypothetical points which have not been clearly raised or supported by evidence.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s decision refusing approval under the General Permitted Development Order 2015 for the conversion of an agricultural building into a dwelling. The building was subject to a planning condition permitting use for stated agricultural purposes and for no other purpose.

Collins J had agreed with the inspector that the condition excluded permitted development rights. The claimant renewed the application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, arguing both that the condition did not exclude such rights and that the inspector had failed to address a submission concerning the possible unlawfulness of the building.

1. The renewed application for permission under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was refused. The proposed grounds were not arguable.

2. The condition had to be construed according to its wording and context. It was impermissible to rely on the reason for the condition to go behind the condition itself. The words requiring use for the stated purposes and “for no other purpose” clearly excluded rights under the General Permitted Development Order 2015 and similar rights under the Uses Class Order. The absence of an express reference to the GPDO did not alter that conclusion.

3. The court adopted the approach of Ouseley J in the Rugby Football Union case. That authority was not contradicted by any other relevant authority.

4. The claimant’s alternative submission depended on the hypothesis that the building had not been lawfully constructed. The material relied on expressed only conditional doubt and did not establish that hypothesis. The point had not been clearly ventilated and was unsupported by evidence.

5. In a written-representation appeal, an inspector must deal with the main arguments advanced. The inspector is not required to investigate possible hypothetical points buried in the papers or address matters that have not been clearly pursued.

6. The costs order was corrected. The claimant was ordered to pay the Secretary of State £500, with no order for the costs of the renewed application.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The renewed application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was refused. The court upheld the inspector’s approach and Collins J’s dismissal of the principal argument.