TH v Chapter of Worcester Cathedral & Anor

Religious bodies are not necessarily public authorities merely because they consult public safeguarding officials or act to protect children. The court must examine the body’s functions and the nature of the particular act. Factors include statutory powers, public funding, governmental character, public administration, accountability and the United Kingdom’s international obligations. Controlling access to a cathedral for bell-ringing and issuing diocesan pastoral conditions were private acts, so section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 was not engaged and the decisions were not amenable to judicial review. Restrictions on a hobby did not engage Article 8, and the factual findings, sanctions and procedure were proportionate and fair.

The claimant challenged two safeguarding-related decisions. The Chapter of Worcester Cathedral withdrew his permission to belong to its Guild of Bell Ringers and to ring at the Cathedral. The Bishop of Worcester later invited him to sign an agreement imposing conditions on bell-ringing elsewhere in the diocese. The claimant alleged irrationality, breach of Article 8, bias, predetermination and inadequate disclosure.

The defendants argued that the decisions were private, outside judicial review, and that the challenge to the first decision was out of time. The court considered jurisdiction, limitation, whether the second letter constituted a reviewable decision, proportionality and procedural fairness.

1. Jurisdiction. Neither defendant was a core or hybrid public authority. Applying the factors identified from Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank and Another and YL v Birmingham City Council and Others, neither had assumed a local authority’s role, performed a governmental or public-administration function, possessed safeguarding powers, received relevant public funding or had democratic accountability. Consulting the LADO did not transfer the LADO’s statutory responsibilities to the defendants.
2. The relevant acts were private. The first decision exercised control over access to the Cathedral and the second concerned the internal pastoral administration of the diocese. The reasons for the decisions, including child safeguarding, were not the functions or acts themselves. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 was therefore not engaged, and neither decision was amenable to judicial review.
3. Limitation and the second decision. The challenge to the first decision, made nearly eight months after it, was five months late. The first and second decisions were separate decisions by separate decision-makers, and there was no continuing act or basis to extend time. The July letter was nevertheless treated, by concession, as a decision capable of challenge because it followed negotiations and the alternative consequence of refusing agreement.
4. Article 8 and merits. Restrictions on bell-ringing, treated as a hobby or pastime, did not engage Article 8. In any event, the findings and sanctions were proportionate. The evidence established inappropriate boundary-crossing, private contact with young people, unauthorised outings and inappropriate messaging. The Cathedral ban reflected the LADO’s advice, the claimant’s lack of insight and the practical difficulty of supervision in a teaching centre. The diocesan restrictions were less severe and equally justified.
5. Procedure. Actual and apparent bias, predetermination and inadequate disclosure were rejected. The fair-minded and informed observer test applied to apparent bias. Even assuming further disclosure was required, the underlying allegations had been fairly put and non-disclosure could not have affected the outcome. The common-law irrationality claim also failed. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused and the claim was dismissed.