Rahman, R (on the application of) v Local Government Election Court & Ors

An election court’s decision is amenable to judicial review for error of law, including a factual conclusion unsupported by evidence. The statutory procedure for stating a case does not exclude judicial review where the legal issue cannot sensibly be separated from the facts and is of public importance.

For the purposes of bribery under the Representation of the People Act 1983, a grant may constitute giving money even where conditions attach to its use. Payment to one person may induce voters through that person without the recipient being required to hold the money for the voters. The statute does not require inducing the vote to be the sole or dominant purpose.

Mr Rahman challenged findings of the Local Government Election Court arising from a petition concerning the 2014 Tower Hamlets mayoral election. The challenged findings concerned paid canvassers under section 111, bribery under section 113, and undue influence by spiritual injury under section 115 of the Representation of the People Act 1983.

Following his bankruptcy, the court also considered whether the judicial review claim vested in a trustee in bankruptcy and whether the election court’s decision could be reviewed despite the statutory case-stating procedure. The central procedural issue was whether permission should be granted, and if so on which grounds.

1. The claimant’s challenge to findings concerning his character and reputation was personal to him and did not vest in a trustee in bankruptcy. He had no locus to challenge the election court’s costs order, which could be pursued only by the trustee. Permission therefore had to exclude any challenge to costs.

2. The decision of an election court is amenable to judicial review for error of law notwithstanding sections 144(1) and 145(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. Error of law includes a factual finding for which there is no evidential basis or a conclusion not reasonably open on the evidence.

3. There was no arguable error of law in the findings concerning paid canvassers. Nor was there a realistic prospect of successfully challenging the bribery findings. Under section 113(2), grants could amount to gifts even if subject to conditions. A payment to X could induce voter Y without X holding the money for Y or being the person who carried out the inducing. It was sufficient that inducing voters was a purpose; the statute imposed no sole or dominant-purpose requirement. A person controlling public funds could make a payment on behalf of a candidate where he deliberately directed the funds to induce support for that candidate. Section 113(5) created a distinct offence with its own requirement that the recipient receive money or a gift for voting.

4. The ground concerning spiritual injury was arguable. The issue was difficult and of general public interest, and the existing decisions largely concerned nineteenth-century Irish conditions. Applying section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 of its own motion, the court considered that success on this discrete corrupt-practice finding would have produced a substantially different outcome. Exceptional public interest would also have justified disregarding the statutory refusal requirement if necessary.

5. Section 146(4) of the 1983 Act did not prevent judicial review in these circumstances. The issue was important to the claimant and the conduct of elections, and could not sensibly be considered independently of the factual findings. Permission was granted on ground 3 only, subject to the undertaking not to challenge the costs orders. The other findings and the five-year disqualification remained undisturbed.

The judgment describes the Local Government Election Court’s decision of 23 April 2015, which declared the claimant’s 2014 mayoral election void. Ouseley J adjourned the permission application on 9 October 2015. The Divisional Court granted permission for judicial review on the spiritual-injury ground only.