Steinfeld & Anor v The Secretary of State for Education

The exclusion of opposite-sex couples from civil partnerships did not become incompatible with Arts 8 and 14 of the Convention merely because same-sex couples were later permitted to marry. Article 14 requires a difference in treatment to fall within the ambit of a substantive Convention right. A personal interest sufficiently close to the core values of family or private life is required. Where a couple can obtain equivalent legal recognition, rights and protections through marriage, the inability to choose civil partnership may have only a tenuous connection with Art 8. In any event, maintaining the position temporarily while the Government gathered evidence about the effect of same-sex marriage on civil partnerships was objectively justified and proportionate.

The claimants, an opposite-sex couple with ideological objections to marriage, wished to enter a civil partnership. Sections 1 and 3(1)(a) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 limited civil partnerships to same-sex couples. The claimants sought a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, arguing that the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 had made the restriction discriminatory under Arts 14 and 8 of the Convention.

The central issues were whether the restriction fell within the ambit of Art 8 and, alternatively, whether the Government’s decision to await evidence before changing the civil-partnership scheme was objectively justified.

1. Claim dismissed. The restrictions in sections 1 and 3(1)(a) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 had not become unlawful because same-sex couples acquired the additional option of marriage.
2. Article 14 could be invoked only if the difference in treatment affected a personal interest sufficiently close to the core values protected by Art 8. Those values include the love, trust, confidence, mutual dependence and social intercourse of family life, and personal and sexual autonomy in private life. The claimants’ relationship, family life and private life were not impaired. They could obtain equivalent recognition, rights and protections by marrying, and their refusal to do so was a matter of conscience.
3. The court was bound by Wilkinson v Kitzinger, [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), which remained good law. Schalk and Kopf v Austria and (2011) 53 EHRR 20 concerned the absence or timing of legal recognition, not the choice between two legally equivalent forms of recognition. Vallianatos v Greece, (2014) 59 EHRR 12, likewise did not establish that the existence of a different legal status must itself engage Art 8.
4. Alternatively, even assuming that Arts 8 and 14 were engaged, maintaining the difference temporarily was objectively justified. The Government was entitled to wait for reliable evidence about the practical effect of same-sex marriage on demand for civil partnerships before choosing between extension, abolition or phasing out. The absence of a specified timetable did not make that approach disproportionate.

First-instance judicial review claim. No prior procedural history requiring recording was stated in the judgment.