Jones v Longley & Ors

A statement of case may be struck out where its prolixity, lack of coherence or insufficient particularity makes it impossible in practice to plead to and thereby obstructs the just disposal of proceedings. Litigants in person are subject to the same procedural rules as represented parties, although limited discretion may sometimes justify modest procedural leeway. A counterclaim against a third party, or against an existing party in a different capacity, requires permission and must relate to or be connected with the subject matter of the proceedings. In deciding whether strike-out is proportionate, the court should consider the seriousness of the breach, the reasons for it, all the circumstances, the overriding objective, the interests of the opposing party and the court’s limited resources.

The claimant, a beneficiary and former co-executor of an estate, applied under CPR rule 3.4(2)(a) and (b) to strike out a counterclaim filed by the first defendant, who acted in person for himself and the other defendants. The counterclaim alleged professional negligence, maladministration and losses involving the claimant and his former law firm. It consisted of lengthy, repetitive and poorly structured material, mixed claims brought in different capacities and against different persons, and failed to provide a coherent case on causation and loss.

The court considered whether the counterclaim complied with an earlier order and the rules governing statements of case, whether permission was required for parts of the counterclaim, and whether a further opportunity to amend should be given.

1. The counterclaim was seriously non-compliant with CPR Part 16, the relevant practice direction and the Chancery Guide. It was not concise, was not arranged in consecutively numbered paragraphs, did not consistently state one allegation per paragraph, and did not present the case on a point-by-point basis. These requirements enable the opposing party to plead, disclose documents and prepare evidence, and enable the court to manage and decide the case fairly.

2. The counterclaim was largely impossible to plead to. It mixed claims said to arise in different capacities and against different parties, contained serious but generalised allegations without adequate particulars, and lacked a coherent case on causation and loss. It therefore obstructed the just disposal of the proceedings within CPR rule 3.4(2)(b).

3. Under section 49(2)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, read with the historical legislation and CPR rule 20.9(2), a counterclaim against a third party must relate to or be connected with the original subject matter. Permission under CPR rule 8.7 for a counterclaim in a Part 8 claim was not permission under CPR rule 20.5 to claim against a person other than the claimant. The same connection requirement applied to claims against an existing party in a different capacity.

4. There is one procedural regime for represented parties and litigants in person. The court may allow limited leeway at the margins, but the absence of legal representation does not disapply ordinary procedural requirements.

5. The principles derived from Mitchell and Denton were relevant to a strike-out for non-compliance, but the court had to assess the proportionality of imposing strike-out itself, rather than relief from an existing sanction. The defendants had already had two opportunities to formulate a compliant counterclaim, had not accepted the defects or sought professional assistance, required permission for parts of the claim, and appeared to have weak underlying claims. Having considered the overriding objective, the claimant’s position and the interests of other court users, the counterclaim was struck out under rule 3.4(2)(b). The application to amend the notice and for summary judgment therefore required no determination.