The Friends of Finsbury Park, R (on the application of) v Haringey London Borough Council

A local authority had power under section 145 of the Local Government Act 1972 to enclose or set apart the necessary part of a public park for an entertainment, including the temporary closure required to construct, hold and dismantle the event. That power was not subject to the more restrictive limits in section 44 of the Public Health Amendment Act 1890 or article 7 of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Greater London Parks and Open Spaces) Act 1967. Consultation had to satisfy the usual Gunning requirements, but its scope could be limited to the principle of holding the event where operational arrangements were to be considered later. A failure to comply with public-access requirements did not justify relief where it was highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different.

The claimant, a recognised friends organisation for Finsbury Park, challenged the Council’s decision to hire part of the Park to Festival Republic Ltd for the Wireless Festival. The challenge concerned the Council’s statutory power to close part of the Park, the adequacy of consultation, compliance with executive decision-making and disclosure requirements, and failure to consider the Finsbury Park Management Plan.

The Council had granted permission for the 2016 event after earlier Wireless festivals and related consultation. The proposed attendance was 45,000, with temporary closure and event infrastructure extending beyond the performance dates. The central issues were whether the Council acted within its statutory powers and whether any procedural failures warranted quashing the decision.

1. Statutory power. Section 145 of the Local Government Act 1972, read on its own, authorised the Council to permit the event. Section 145(2)(a) expressly allowed part of a park to be enclosed or set apart. That necessarily included closing it to the public, and section 145(1) extended to anything necessary or expedient for an entertainment of any nature, including preparation, dismantling and safe operation.
2. The limits in section 44 of the Public Health Amendment Act 1890 and article 7 of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Greater London Parks and Open Spaces) Act 1967 applied to separate additional powers. They did not qualify or restrict section 145. Article 7 was itself additional to other powers by virtue of article 20, and section 44 was likewise an additional power.
3. Consultation. The requirements identified in R (Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council [2014] 1 WLR 3947, drawing on R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gunning [1985] 84 LGR 168, applied. Consultation had to occur while proposals remained formative, provide sufficient reasons, allow adequate time for response, and involve conscientious consideration of the responses. The consultation here was directed to the principle of holding Wireless 2016. Detailed operational and safety matters were properly left for subsequent event planning and Safety Advisory Group consideration. The consultation was therefore adequate.
4. Executive decision and disclosure. The decision was not a key decision under regulation 8 of the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012. Event income assisting the Parks Budget did not amount to significant expenditure or savings. The Council should nevertheless have published the report five clear days before the decision, but the court applied section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981: it was highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different.
5. The Council had not failed to consider a material matter. The earlier Management Plan had been superseded by the Events Policy, which aligned attendance limits with the premises-licensing process. In any event, the existing premises licence permitted up to 49,999 persons and the proposed attendance was 45,000.
6. The claim was dismissed. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on all grounds, but no ground justified relief.