Rahimian, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

The statutory time limit for appealing against an enforcement notice under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 174(3), is absolute and cannot be extended. The decision-maker must nevertheless consider whether an appeal was sent in time under the relevant statutory gateway, including electronic transmission in section 174(3)(c). A decision which addresses only other statutory routes is unlawful. Delay in bringing judicial review may be insufficient to refuse relief where quashing is necessary to secure a determination of an unconsidered statutory right of appeal.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to entertain two appeals against enforcement notices. The notices took effect on 1 August 2014. Appeals submitted through the Planning Portal were received shortly after midnight, but the claimant argued that earlier attempts had been made and that the appeals should be treated as sent in time under section 174(3)(c) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

The Secretary of State accepted that the Planning Inspectorate had not considered that provision. The interested local authority opposed relief and relied on delay, because the claim was issued outside the six-week period in CPR 54.5(5). The issues were whether the refusal should be quashed and whether delay caused sufficient detriment to good administration to justify refusing relief.

1. Absolute time limit. The time limit for an appeal against an enforcement notice under section 174(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is absolute. The Secretary of State has no power to extend it. The court accepted the established position stated in Howard v Secretary of State for the Environment, [1975] QB 235, R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte JBI Financial Consultants, (1989) 58 P & CR 84, and R (Stern) v Horsham District Council, [2013] PTSR 1502.
2. Failure to address the relevant statutory route. The refusal letter considered only sections 174(3)(a) and (b), although the claimant’s case required consideration of section 174(3)(c), concerning electronic communications sent at a time when they would ordinarily be delivered before the effective date. The decision was therefore unlawful and had to be quashed.
3. Later correspondence did not cure the error. The subsequent decision continued to treat the matter as one involving an extension of time and made acceptance dependent on the Council’s consent. It did not determine whether section 174(3)(c) was satisfied.
4. Delay and relief. Although the claim was brought outside the six-week period in CPR 54.5(5), any detriment to good administration under section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 carried very limited weight. Refusing relief would have deprived the claimant of a determination on a statutory route that had not been considered. The decision dated 14 August 2014 was quashed, with no order as to costs.