Wildbur, R (on the application of) v Ministry of Defence

Under section 334(8) of the Armed Forces Act 2006, redress for a well-founded service complaint is not confined to financial compensation. It may comprise a wider package, including restoration to service, salary-related payment and an apology. The decision-maker must identify redress that bears a clear relationship to the wrong, but the choice remains primarily one for the decision-maker, subject to ordinary public-law rationality review. A court does not substitute its own view merely because another panel might reasonably have reached a different result. Where the statute prescribes no particular procedure, rationality does not generally require further factual inquiries unless the circumstances make the information obviously material. A costs discretion need not be exercised where the complainant has not invited the panel to consider costs.

The claimant, a former Army officer, challenged the decision of an Army Service Complaint Panel. The Panel had found that he was wrongfully selected for compulsory redundancy and offered redress comprising an opportunity to return to service, payment equivalent to salary until notification of the decision, and an apology.

The claimant argued that the Panel had misconstrued section 334(8) of the Armed Forces Act 2006, unlawfully fettered its discretion, failed to investigate his personal financial circumstances, and acted irrationally. He also argued that the Panel should have considered reimbursing his legal costs. The central issues were the scope of redress, the procedural requirements governing its assessment, the intensity of rationality review, and the Panel’s costs discretion.

1. Claim dismissed. The Panel’s decision was within the powers conferred by section 334(8) of the Armed Forces Act 2006.
2. “Redress” is not limited to financial compensation. It may include a package of measures appropriate to the wrong, including restoration to service, financial protection and non-financial measures such as an apology. “Appropriate” requires a clear relationship between the redress offered and the wrong suffered, but the selection of redress is initially for the Panel.
3. The applicable review was ordinary public-law review. The court would intervene for misconstruction of the statute, taking an irrelevant consideration into account, failing to take an obligatory consideration into account, procedural irregularity where material, or a decision so unreasonable as to be perverse. A different reasonable decision would not establish unlawfulness.
4. The Panel had not unlawfully fettered its discretion by treating the Special Capital Payment and Re-settlement Grant as fixed sums. Its decision was framed as an overall package. The alternative of return to service could itself provide complete redress, while the financial provisions protected the claimant from loss if he chose to remain in civilian employment.
5. The statute prescribed no particular procedure and did not require the Panel to obtain detailed evidence of the claimant’s subsequent income or work. Further inquiries might have been sensible, but rationality did not make them obligatory because the Panel decided the principles of redress and left detailed implementation for later. The decision was not perverse.
6. The Panel had a discretion to award legal costs. However, the claimant had not asked it to exercise that discretion. In the circumstances, the Panel’s failure to consider costs was not an error of law.
7. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, subject to detailed assessment. The court also considered that the parties had made genuine attempts at alternative dispute resolution, but found no sufficient reason to displace the usual costs outcome.