Balewski v Regional Court, Gdansk, Poland

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, hardship caused by extradition does not by itself amount to oppression. The threshold is crossed where the combined effect of delay and the requested person’s changed circumstances makes extradition unjust or oppressive. Relevant matters include prejudice to the trial, the seriousness of the alleged offence, the extent and culpability of the delay, the person’s integration in the requested state, psychological vulnerability, and the likely effect of removal on hard-won personal stability. Where the first-instance judge has failed to give material evidence proper weight, the appellate court may reconsider the issue afresh. A disproportionate interference with article 8 rights may provide an alternative ground, although it need not be decided where section 14 is determinative.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against an order for his extradition to Poland on an accusation warrant concerning alleged fraud offences dating from 1999. The District Judge rejected objections based on passage of time, article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and mental condition, and ordered extradition on 27 November 2015.

Permission to appeal was granted. The central issues were whether extradition was barred by section 14 because it would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time, and whether it would be a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s article 8 rights.

1. Appeal allowed. The District Judge’s decision was wrong and the appellant was ordered to be discharged.
2. Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires consideration of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time. The distinction identified in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 remains relevant: injustice is directed primarily to prejudice in the conduct of the trial, while oppression concerns hardship resulting from changes in the requested person’s circumstances. The concepts may overlap.
3. Hardship is a usual consequence of extradition and does not ordinarily establish oppression. However, hardship may become so severe that it does constitute oppression. The seriousness of the alleged offences remains relevant.
4. The District Judge had summarised only briefly the substantial changes in the appellant’s life since 2010. That demonstrated that the evidence had not been given the importance it required. The appellate court therefore considered the issue afresh.
5. The appellant had achieved substantial integration in England, including stable employment, accommodation, supportive friendships and recovery from serious alcohol addiction. He was psychologically vulnerable and had no support network in Poland. Extradition would probably cause a decline into his former condition. The unexplained delay between 2011 and 2015, including at least two culpable years, was particularly significant because it coincided with the period of his recovery and stabilisation.
6. In those circumstances, the total delay made extradition oppressive under section 14. It was unnecessary to decide the article 8 ground, although extradition would, if necessary, have been found disproportionate.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — The appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order was allowed and the appellant was discharged.
2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court — On 27 November 2015 the District Judge ordered extradition to Poland under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003.
3. Permission to appeal — Cranston J granted permission on 26 January 2016.