Cruelty Free International, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An exemption from the requirement to provide dogs with outside runs must be determined case by case. The question whether provision is possible is not confined to physical possibility. It includes scientific, animal-welfare and animal-health considerations under Directive 2010/63/EU. A competent authority may accept that outside access is unsuitable where it creates a material risk of pathogen transmission affecting animals bred for scientific purposes. It need not undertake a detailed investigation of local pathogen prevalence where the existence and changing nature of environmental vectors make that exercise incapable of serving a sensible decision-making purpose.

The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant’s decision of 21 July 2014 granting B & K Universal Limited an exemption from the requirement to provide outside runs for dogs bred for scientific purposes. The exemption was sought because outside access could expose the dogs to pathogens and compromise their health status and suitability for safety assessment studies.

The claimant argued that the decision unlawfully treated dogs used for scientific research as generally unsuitable for outside runs and failed to consider local pathogen conditions. Blake J had granted permission and extended time. The central issues were whether the exemption had been determined individually and whether local pathogen prevalence was a material consideration that had to be investigated.

1. Claim dismissed. The exemption decision was lawful and was based on the particular circumstances of the interested party and its application.
2. The requirement in Annex III that dogs should, where possible, be provided with outside runs had to be read with Article 33(3), which permits exemptions for scientific, animal-welfare or animal-health reasons. “Possible” did not mean merely physically possible. Outside runs necessarily left dogs exposed to environmental vectors, including insects, birds and vermin, and could therefore create infection risks.
3. The defendant had correctly adopted a case-by-case approach. The decision did not establish that every establishment keeping dogs for scientific purposes must receive an exemption. Other establishments might properly provide outside runs, depending on their circumstances.
4. The decision-maker was entitled to conclude that the risk of pathogen transmission could render outside runs unsuitable for dogs bred mainly for safety assessment. Properly designed indoor accommodation could still meet the animals’ physiological and ethological needs.
5. There was no unlawful failure to consider local conditions. The relevant question was whether environmental vectors could transmit pathogens, not the precise prevalence of each infection at the site. Local conditions were difficult to establish, inherently changeable and could be affected by wildlife, including migrating birds. Investigating them would serve no sensible purpose in the circumstances.
6. The court noted that it should be slow to find a breach where decisions depended on scientific expertise, particularly where the challenge was framed on Wednesbury grounds. In any event, the claim fell well short of that threshold. The claimant was ordered to pay the usual costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. Permission to appeal was refused.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Blake J granted permission for the claim to proceed out of time and extended time. The Administrative Court dismissed the claim and refused permission to appeal.