M, Re (No 2)

In care proceedings, the court must distinguish permissible diversity in parenting from conduct that causes, or perpetuates, significant harm. The welfare of the child remains paramount, and removing a child from parental care requires the exceptional conclusion that nothing else will do. The court must assess the child’s individual vulnerabilities and the actual impact of the parenting provided. A loving relationship, parental commitment, religious conviction and otherwise respectable characteristics do not outweigh demonstrated emotional harm, an absence of empathy, or an inability to understand the child’s needs. Articles 8 and 9 require respect for family life and religious freedom, but they do not entitle a parent to maintain family ties where doing so would harm the child’s health or development.

Cambridgeshire County Council sought care orders concerning two adopted boys, JK and JA, who had experienced severe abuse and neglect before adoption. Following allegations of physical punishment, restraint, cold showers, soap being used as punishment and religious practices involving alleged demonic possession, both children entered alternative care.

The matter came before the High Court as a rehearing after an earlier care-order decision proceeded on an agreed threshold statement which did not reflect the parents’ true position or the evidence. The parents sought the return of JA, principally contending that the local authority had caused the family’s difficulties by failing to provide support. The central issues were whether the parents’ conduct had caused or contributed to the children’s harm and whether JA could safely return home.

1. The court reheard the local authority’s application and found the threshold facts overwhelmingly established. The parents had imposed a rigid, controlling and punitive parenting regime, including physical punishment, restraint, cold showers, soap punishment and frightening religious practices. That conduct caused emotional harm and re-traumatised children already profoundly vulnerable because of their earlier experiences.

2. The court adopted the legal principles stated in Devon County Council v EB & Ors [2013] EWHC 968. The local authority bore the burden of proving the facts on the balance of probabilities. Because a care order interferes with the family bond, the court had to be satisfied that nothing else would do.

3. Applying Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings) [2013] UKSC 33, the court treated separation as an exceptional step justified only by overriding welfare requirements. The welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 applied, with the children’s welfare paramount.

4. The court also applied the principles reflected in Y v United Kingdom [2012] 55 EHRR and Re L [2007] 1 FLR 2015. The state must tolerate diverse parenting, including eccentric or inadequate parenting, but it need not preserve family ties where doing so would harm the child’s health or development. Religious belief and parental rights did not justify conduct which frightened and destabilised these children.

5. The decisive issue was the continuing mismatch between the children’s needs and the parents’ attitudes and parenting style. The parents had shown no meaningful reflection, empathy or change, and support would not make reunification safe or realistic. Nothing less than a care order would protect JA and meet his overwhelming need for a predictable, nurturing and loving home.

6. A care order was made and the care plan accepted. No order was made at that stage in relation to contact, although future constructive contact was left open. An application under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 was refused, but future applications were reserved to the judge and were to be referred to him before the children were informed.

The judgment records that the parents appealed the earlier care order concerning JA. The appeal was heard on 19 January 2016, and judgment was handed down on 2 February 2016 by Lady Justice King. The matter was then reheard in the High Court.