Malik v Trump

A defamation claim must plead the defamatory meaning said to arise from the publication. Failure to do so, after an opportunity to comply with an unless order, may result in automatic strike-out. The claimant must also be identified by name or by facts which make clear that the publication refers to him. A publication must be read as a whole, including any material which counters or qualifies the words complained of. Convention rights do not ordinarily give rise to a claim against a private individual who is not a public authority. Offensive political statements do not necessarily interfere with religious freedom, and the statutory protection of free expression remains relevant.

The claimant, a British Muslim politician, sought damages concerning statements attributed to the defendant about Muslims and areas of London. He applied for permission to serve the claim form in the United States or to treat delivery in Scotland as valid service out of the jurisdiction.

The court considered whether the pleaded claim was actionable, including issues of defamatory meaning, identification, defamation of a group, Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, and statutory claims. It also considered whether the claim had a reasonable prospect of success for the purposes of service out.

1. Disposition. The claim was automatically struck out under the unless order because the claimant had not pleaded the defamatory meaning required by CPR 53 PD 2.3. Even if it had not been struck out, permission to serve out, and permission to treat service in Scotland as valid, would have been refused because the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.
2. Defamatory meaning. Pleading the natural and ordinary meaning, and any innuendo meaning with the relevant extrinsic facts, is a vital part of a defamation claim. The claimant had been given a further opportunity to comply but had not done so.
3. Identification. A claimant must be named or identified by facts known to the reader which make clear who is referred to. The fact that a person belongs to a broad class, such as Muslims or London residents, is insufficient. The references to parts of London did not identify the claimant or Green Street with the necessary specificity.
4. Whole publication. The articles relied on had to be read as a whole. Their surrounding content contradicted or demolished the alleged defamatory meaning, so the publications were not capable of defaming the claimant even if they referred to him.
5. Convention and statutory claims. The defendant was not a public authority and therefore could not be sued directly for breach of Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998. Although Islam fell within Article 9, the statements did not have a sufficiently strong connection with the claimant’s ability to hold or exercise his religious beliefs in the United Kingdom. The Equality Act 2010 claim was unpleaded. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 created criminal offences and no private cause of action. The court also noted the statutory emphasis on freedom of expression in section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986.
6. Service out. The claimant had to establish a reasonable prospect of success, a good arguable case within a jurisdictional gateway, and grounds for exercising the discretion to permit service. Those requirements were not met.

The judgment does not state an appellate history for this claim.