Director of Public Prosecutions, R (on the application of) v Stratford Youth Court (Rev 1)

A sentencing decision of a magistrates’ or youth court may be reviewed by judicial review only in exceptional circumstances. Intervention is justified where the sentence is truly astonishing, lies so far outside the reasonable range of penalties as to indicate a manifest error of law, or results from failure to have regard to a material consideration.

Youth courts must balance the offender’s welfare and rehabilitation against the gravity of the offending, public protection and deterrence. Sentencing guidelines must be followed unless the interests of justice require departure, with reasons. Subsequent progress, delay and double-jeopardy considerations may be relevant when the sentence is reconsidered after quashing, but do not prevent quashing an irrational sentence.

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought judicial review of a sentence imposed by Stratford Youth Court on C, aged 17, who had pleaded guilty to robbery involving a knife and causing serious hand injuries, and threatening another with a knife.

The Youth Court imposed a 12-month referral order, a nine-month curfew and compensation. It recognised the seriousness of the offending but departed from the applicable robbery guideline because it considered a community order the best means of preventing further offending. The issue was whether the decision not to impose a substantial custodial sentence, or to commit C to the Crown Court for sentence under section 3B of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, was susceptible to judicial review.

1. The decision was quashed and remitted to the Youth Court. The sentence was truly astonishing and so far outside the reasonable range of penalties as to indicate a manifest error of law.
2. A youth court’s sentencing decision is not subject to an ordinary appeal by judicial review. The exceptional threshold is nevertheless met where the decision is irrational in the sense identified in R v Warley Justices ex parte DPP, namely where it is truly astonishing or the court has failed to have regard to a material consideration. The court will not interfere lightly. The earlier authorities, including R v St Albans Crown Court ex parte Cinnamond, R v Croydon Crown Court ex parte Miller and R v Truro Crown Court ex parte RD, supported that approach.
3. The Youth Court had correctly recognised the importance of C’s welfare and rehabilitation. Those considerations had to be balanced against the exceptional seriousness of the offending, the applicable sentencing guideline, public protection and deterrence. Under the guideline and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, departure required reasons. The stated reason that a community order was best for preventing future offending did not explain the substantial departure from a custodial guideline starting point.
4. The subsequent progress made under the referral order, the passage of time and the effect of renewed sentencing on C and his family were relevant matters for the Youth Court on reconsideration. They were not matters capable of preventing the High Court from quashing a sentence which was legally irrational. The Youth Court could reconsider whether to sentence within its jurisdiction, including at its uppermost limits, or commit C to the Crown Court under section 3B of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

Mr Justice Singh agreed.

The claim was a judicial review of the sentence imposed by Stratford Youth Court on 18 February 2016. The High Court quashed the sentence and remitted the matter to the Youth Court for reconsideration.