Tendring District Council & Ors v Persons Unknown

An injunction directed to persons unknown should not be granted merely because an important public event may be disrupted by unauthorised encampments. The court must assess the particular evidence, the legal wrongs relied upon, the effect on affected individuals, and the scope and precedent of the proposed order. Existing statutory powers, including those under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, form part of the legislative balance and their limited flexibility is not a reason to enlarge the court’s jurisdiction. An order covering increasingly wide displacement areas, and potentially serving as a model for similar orders at other public events, requires especially careful justification. Where the evidence does not establish a sufficient case of nuisance, obstruction, public safety or other legal wrong, the injunction should be refused.

Several local authorities and landowners sought, without notice to any known person, an injunction against persons unknown. The order would prohibit parking or placing campervans, mobile homes, caravans and tents on specified land and roads in and around Clacton-on-Sea during the 2016 airshow and associated food and drink festival.

The claim form referred to trespass, parking-control breaches, nuisance and highway obstruction, while the application notice referred to breaches of planning control. The claimants relied on disruption caused by earlier unauthorised encampments and argued that existing statutory powers were insufficiently flexible. The central issue was whether the evidence and circumstances justified granting an injunction of final practical effect for the relevant year.

1. Application refused. The court declined to grant the injunction on the evidence and in the circumstances of the case.
2. The court examined the legal wrongs identified by the claimants rather than treating the importance of the airshow as determinative. The evidence showed previous encampments and inconvenience, including effects on car parks, but it did not establish a sufficient case of public safety risk, serious nuisance, highway obstruction or other conduct warranting the proposed order. Criminal behaviour could be addressed through the police’s existing powers.
3. The court considered the availability and limits of statutory enforcement. Section 77 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 permits directions requiring persons residing in vehicles on specified land or highways to leave and remove their vehicles, with criminal consequences for non-compliance. The fact that the statutory procedure was reactive or lacked the flexibility sought by the claimants reflected the balance chosen by Parliament.
4. The evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that members of the traveller community had adequate alternative places to park or stay during the event. The proposed order would particularly affect people adopting a traveller lifestyle and would be directed to persons unknown, although some individuals previously involved in encampments could potentially have been identified.
5. The court was concerned that the proposed area had expanded to include possible displacement sites. That approach could produce injunctions of ever-increasing scope and encourage similar applications for other major public events. The later reference to national security and terrorism did not alter the result because the application was not directed to those matters. Road closures and parking orders were more appropriate means of keeping the seafront road clear of vehicles.