Evangelou & Ors v McNicol

The rules of an unincorporated association form a contract between its members. The court determines their proper meaning as a matter of law, and an internal rule cannot oust that jurisdiction. A body given power to define eligibility criteria may regulate how eligible members are identified, but cannot redefine a category of members so as to exclude persons whom the constitution entitles to participate. A procedural power to set an election timetable or freeze date does not authorise a retrospective disenfranchisement or the imposition of a substantive qualification absent clear contractual authority.

The claimants were members of the Labour Party who had joined between 12 January and 12 July 2016. The National Executive Committee had decided that only members with six months’ continuous membership by 12 July could vote in the Party leadership election.

The claimants argued that this restriction breached the contractual constitution contained in the 2016 Rule Book. The defendant relied on the NEC’s powers to define eligibility criteria, set election procedures and determine disputes. The fifth claimant also raised an age-discrimination claim concerning registered supporters.

1. The claim succeeded. The judgment stood as declaratory relief. The defendant was ordered to pay £25 damages to each of the second, third and fourth claimants, with liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice.
2. The Labour Party was an unincorporated association. Its Rule Book constituted a contract between members. Under Chapter 2 Clause I(2), members had equivalent rights except where the rules prescribed an exception. Chapter 4 Clause II(2)(C)(vi) provided that votes in a leadership election were cast by Labour Party members, affiliated supporters and registered supporters.
3. Chapter 4 Clause II(2)(C)(vii), which empowered the NEC to define precise eligibility criteria, concerned the identification and administration of eligible electors. It did not permit the NEC to redefine “members” so as to exclude a category of members included by the Rule Book.
4. The court had jurisdiction to determine the proper interpretation of the Rule Book. Chapter 1 Clause X(5) could not make an erroneous NEC interpretation legally correct or oust the court’s jurisdiction. The NEC nevertheless possessed a substantial area of judgment in applying the rules, particularly in relation to election procedure and soft-edged obligations.
5. A freeze date ordinarily crystallised eligibility from a current or future point after the election process had begun. It could not retrospectively impose a six-month membership requirement. No provision of the Rule Book gave the NEC power to impose that substantive restriction in a leadership election.
6. The claimants had joined on the common understanding, reflected in the Rule Book, that members joining before the election process commenced could vote in a leadership contest. Refusing their votes solely because they had not been members since 12 January 2016 was therefore a breach of contract.
7. The fifth claimant’s alternative discrimination claim became hypothetical. Any such claim would fall within the county court’s jurisdiction and would be fact-specific. No transfer was ordered.