Guney v Kingsley Napley & Anor

Late amendments are governed by the overriding objective and the court’s duty to manage litigation proportionately. The fact that an amendment will not necessarily destroy the trial date is not sufficient. The applicant must explain the delay and show why justice requires the amendment. The court must consider its significance, evidential consequences, effect on the trial timetable, consistency with the existing case, and apparent merits. Summary judgment is appropriate where an issue has no real prospect of success and there is no compelling reason for trial. A claim may be struck out where it discloses no reasonable grounds, including claims for losses too remote from the professional duty assumed or unsupported claims for general damages for litigation-related stress and inconvenience.

The claimant brought a professional negligence claim against her solicitors arising from their conduct of litigation concerning the estate of the late Ramadan Guney. She alleged that earlier advice would have enabled an earlier settlement and avoided costs and other losses.

The defendants applied for summary judgment on three heads of loss and strike out on two others. Shortly before the hearing, the claimant also sought permission to amend the Particulars of Claim to plead the possible validity of a 1994 will and a substantial lost-chance claim concerning properties. The court had to determine whether the amendments should be permitted and whether the challenged heads of loss should proceed to trial.

1. Applications to amend. The claimant’s applications were refused. Procedural rules must be applied with greater rigour, consistently with proper case management and the need to ensure that only matters suitable for litigation are litigated. The relevant exercise is a balance of competing factors; there is no simple test based on whether the existing trial date can be preserved.
2. The lateness of an amendment requires explanation. Its importance, the evidence and expert valuation it would require, its effect on the trial timetable, its interaction with the existing pleadings, and its merits are relevant. If a trial date would be lost, very compelling circumstances would ordinarily be required. The proposed will amendment would fundamentally alter the litigation, while the proposed property claims were factually inconsistent with substantial parts of the pleaded case and were not compelling.
3. Summary judgment. Applying CPR 24.2, the claims concerning alleged fiduciary-duty losses and 58 and 60 Green Lanes had no real prospect of success and no compelling reason for trial. The solicitors had no relevant duty to investigate whether funds which the claimant represented were hers belonged to a company, and money-laundering duties were not duties owed to the client. The property claims were legally or logically defective, too remote, or inconsistent with the facts relied upon.
4. Strike out. Under CPR 3.4.2, the claim for lost profits was struck out because it was unparticularised, outside the scope of the retainer and too remote. The claim for damages for stress and inconvenience disclosed no reasonable grounds. Litigation involving a family inheritance dispute was not a contract for pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind, and the ordinary stresses of litigation were too remote. Malyon v Lawrance, Messer & Co was distinguishable because it concerned aggravation of an injury which was itself the cause of action.
5. The defendants’ summary judgment application was granted on the first three heads and the strike-out application on the fourth and fifth. Costs followed the event.