Lamot & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Justice

A claim for judicial review becomes academic where the challenged decisions and policies have been superseded, the claimants have obtained the practical relief sought, and no damages claim remains. Declaratory relief will not prevent a claim being academic if it would serve no useful purpose.

An academic public-law claim should proceed only exceptionally and with caution. Relevant considerations include whether a discrete, non-fact-sensitive issue affects numerous existing or anticipated cases, whether the proceedings are sufficiently advanced, and whether determination would provide real public utility. A live case with fact-specific issues is generally the appropriate vehicle for resolving an important legal question.

Three foreign national prisoners serving indeterminate sentences challenged decisions made in 2014 refusing to accept Parole Board recommendations that they be transferred to open conditions. They alleged breaches of policy, unlawfulness, irrationality, and an unlawful refusal by the executive to follow an independent judicial body's decision.

While the claims were pending, one claimant was released, the other two were assessed as presenting a very low risk of absconding, the relevant policies were superseded, and fresh decisions were made. The Secretary of State applied under CPR rule 3.4(1) to strike out the claims as academic, lacking reasonable grounds, or an abuse of process. The central issue was whether the claims should nevertheless proceed in the public interest.

1. Claims struck out. The court granted the Secretary of State's application under CPR rule 3.4(1). The claims were academic because the challenged decisions had fallen away, the policies in force at the time had been superseded, and the claimants had in substance obtained the practical relief sought. Declaratory relief would serve no useful purpose, and no damages claim was pursued.
2. The court applied the principles in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Salem [1991] 1 AC 450 and Rusbridger v Attorney General [2004] 1 AC 357. Courts should decide academic disputes only with caution and where there is a good reason in the public interest. A possible exception may arise where a discrete point of statutory construction is not fact-sensitive and numerous similar cases exist or are anticipated.
3. The formulation in Zoolife [2007] EWHC 2995 and the guidance in Rathakrishnan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 1406 were applied. The claimants had not shown exceptional circumstances. The claims were not materially advanced, no comparable prisoners had been identified, and the rescinded policies had little or no continuing public utility.
4. The issue concerning the relationship between Evans and Harris v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 3752 was fact- and context-specific. It should be resolved in a live case rather than through these academic proceedings.
5. The Defendant was awarded the costs of the strike-out application. The claimants were awarded 50 per cent of their judicial-review costs. Permission to appeal was refused, although the claimants remained free to seek permission from the Court of Appeal.

The judgment describes earlier proceedings in related claims. Harris v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 3752 was dismissed at first instance; an application for permission to appeal was granted on paper, but the proposed appeal was later withdrawn. The present claims were subsequently permitted to proceed and were struck out by the Administrative Court as academic.