Grand Central Sound Studios Ltd, R (on the application of) v City of Westminster & Anor

In a planning decision, the development plan remains the statutory starting point, even where the local authority has announced an intended change of policy. The weight given to existing policies and the balance between competing planning considerations are matters of planning judgment, provided the committee is properly advised.

Office-to-residential conversion is not automatically unacceptable under paragraph 51 of the National Planning Policy Framework. The authority must assess whether strong economic reasons justify refusal and may balance that issue against the need for housing.

A permission may lawfully rely on future mitigation secured through conditions, a section 106 agreement and environmental management procedures where the authority has sufficient technical evidence and rationally concludes that harm can be controlled.

Grand Central Sound Studios Limited sought permission to challenge Westminster City Council’s grant of planning permission to Marlborough House Limited for redevelopment next to the claimant’s sound studios.

The proposed redevelopment involved substantial residential use and construction works capable of causing noise and ground-borne vibration. The claimant argued that the Council had acted unlawfully by permitting office-to-residential conversion, relying on insufficient evidence of mitigation, failing to apply policy COM8 properly, and failing to impose a condition addressing vibration from underground trains.

Permission had previously been refused on the papers by Supperstone J. The renewed application concerned whether any of the four grounds was arguable.

1. The renewed application was refused. None of the four grounds disclosed an arguable error of law.
2. The Council’s announcement that office-to-residential policies were out of date was a material consideration, but the adopted development plan remained the statutory starting point under section 38(6) of the 2004 Act. The weight given to its policies was a matter for the Council’s planning judgment. The committee had been informed of the policy change, the undersupply of offices and the competing need for housing. Its decision not to apply the new interim approach before its stated implementation date was not irrational.
3. The Council had not misunderstood paragraph 51 of the National Planning Policy Framework. Whether there were strong economic reasons to resist conversion was a matter of planning balance. The Council was entitled to conclude that the economic case for retaining offices on this site did not outweigh the need for new homes.
4. The Council had sufficient technical material on vibration. Its Environmental Sciences officers advised that lower vibration levels could be secured through the Site Environmental Management Plan. The section 106 agreement prevented demolition and construction from commencing until the plan had been approved and required compliance with it throughout the works. The Council was entitled to rely on that advice, together with other mitigation measures, in reaching its planning judgment.
5. Policy COM8 was pertinent to redevelopment affecting light industrial floorspace, but the Council was entitled to conclude that the proposed measures would prevent the loss of the claimant’s industrial activity. Policy ENV6 had addressed the noise-sensitive premises. There was no failure to consider a material consideration.
6. Following R v Mendip District Council ex parte Fabre (2000) 80 P&CR 500 and Morge v Hampshire County Council [2011] UKSC 2, the court rejected an excessively demanding approach to the content of officer reports. The absence of a reference to a condition raised orally did not establish an error, particularly where its importance had not been reinforced in subsequent written representations.

The court invited submissions on the order and costs, including whether the claim was an Aarhus Convention claim.

Permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers by Supperstone J on 15 July 2016. The renewed application was refused by the High Court (Administrative Court).