Chandra v Mayor

In representative proceedings, a judgment or order is binding on all represented persons and may be enforced against a non-party represented person with the court’s permission. Permission should ordinarily be granted, absent exceptional circumstances such as collusion. Earlier authorities decided under differently worded rules, and obiter observations that costs cannot be enforced against represented persons, do not override the clear wording of CPR 19.6(4). Claims seeking to enforce indemnity rights out of charitable assets engage the court’s jurisdiction over charitable trusts and therefore require Charity Commission authorisation. Contractual claims against former office-holders do not themselves constitute charity proceedings.

Dr Chandra had obtained judgment for employment-related sums and costs against Dr Mayor, who had been sued representatively on behalf of the executive committee members of Arya Samaj (Vedic Mission) West Midlands. Dr Mayor sought contribution from those members. Dr Chandra sought permission to enforce the judgment and costs order against them. Both sides also sought to join a subsequently formed charitable incorporated organisation as an indemnifying or contributing party. The court had to determine the effect of the representative proceedings, whether enforcement required permission, whether the CIO could be joined without Charity Commission authorisation, and whether the remaining claims should continue on a representative basis.

1. Representative judgment and enforcement. The original claim was properly brought against Dr Mayor in a representative capacity because the executive committee members had the same contractual interest and liability. Under CPR 19.6(4), the judgment, including costs, was binding on all represented persons and could be enforced against any of them with the court’s permission.
2. Exceptional circumstances would be required to withhold permission. The suggestion in Moon v Atherton [1972] 2 QB 435 that costs could not be enforced against represented parties was obiter and could not override the present rule. The earlier decisions in Price v Rhondda UDC [1923] WN 228, Scott v Pascal and Adams (1847) 15 Sim 559, 60 ER 736 and Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Company Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021 concerned differently worded rules and were not followed. The court granted Dr Chandra immediate permission to enforce the outstanding costs against the represented committee members.
3. The court relied on Howells v The Dominion Insurance Company Ltd [2005] EWHC 552 for the exceptional-circumstances approach, while disagreeing with its contrary suggestion on the effect of Moon v Atherton. The recognition of non-party costs orders in Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 supported reconsideration of the older authorities. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v Taylor [1992] 1 Lloyds Rep 484 was also material to that reconsideration.
4. The CIO. A claim depending on rights of indemnity from charitable assets would involve administration of charitable trusts and would therefore be charity proceedings under Charities Act 2011, requiring Charity Commission authorisation. The applications to join the CIO were refused because no authorisation had been obtained. The existing contractual claims against the committee members were not charity proceedings.
5. The ten committee members could be added to the original claim for costs under Senior Courts Act 1981, with both proceedings managed and heard together. Dr Mayor could not act representatively in the contribution proceedings or section 51 applications, although the court was prepared to consider retaining representative status for costs assessment proceedings.

The judgment records that, on 4 July 2014, the same court entered judgment for Dr Chandra against Dr Mayor for employment-related sums, interest and costs. The present judgment determined enforcement, contribution, joinder and representative-proceedings issues arising from that judgment.