A (A Child : permission to permanently relocate)

In an application to relocate a child permanently overseas, the child’s welfare is paramount and no legal presumption favours relocation by a primary carer. Guidance derived from relocation authorities may assist the welfare evaluation, but it must not be applied rigidly or treated as a set of binding principles.

The court must assess the competing welfare outcomes, including the quality of each parent’s proposals, the effect on the child’s relationships, the impact on the relocating parent of refusal, and the practical arrangements for continuing contact. The evaluation is not an arithmetical balance sheet. The court must attribute appropriate weight to each relevant factor and determine the proportionate outcome on the particular facts.

The mother applied for permission to relocate permanently with A, aged five, from England and Wales to the United States. The application was opposed by A’s father, who had regular contact and parental responsibility.

The application followed an earlier refusal of relocation by District Judge Sethi on 31 March 2015. The mother then wrongfully removed A and her half-siblings to the United States. Hague Convention proceedings resulted in an order for A’s return, and she returned to this jurisdiction in February 2016.

The central issue was whether A’s welfare was better served by relocating to the United States with her mother, stepfather and half-siblings, or remaining in England with her mother and maintaining more frequent direct contact with her father and wider family.

1. Welfare paramountcy. The court applied the welfare principle under the Children Act 1989. A’s welfare was paramount and overbore all other considerations, however powerful or reasonable. The statutory welfare checklist and the presumption of parental involvement were relevant, but no presumption favoured an application by a primary carer.
2. Relocation guidance. The guidance summarised in Re TC v JC [2013] 2 FLR 484 was adopted. The court considered whether the application was genuine, whether the proposals were realistic and properly researched, the impact of refusal on the mother, the genuineness of the father’s opposition, the likely detriment to his relationship with A, and the extent to which that detriment would be offset by other family relationships. The guidance was not applied rigidly, and the case was not to be determined by labels such as primary or shared care.
3. Competing outcomes. The mother’s proposals in the United States offered greater housing, financial and emotional stability, together with family life with the stepfather and A’s half-siblings. A’s relationship with her father and wider family in England was important, but relocation would not end that relationship. Direct contact would be reduced and replaced by planned visits and indirect contact.
4. The mother’s wrongful removal raised genuine concerns about future compliance. However, the judge found that the original removal was not motivated by a desire to exclude the father and accepted assurances from the mother and stepfather that contact would be facilitated if relocation were authorised.
5. The decision was not an arithmetical exercise. Having weighed all relevant matters, including A’s emotional needs, sibling relationships, schooling, security, and the likely effect of the mother’s continued separation from her husband, the judge concluded that relocation was more likely to provide a secure and stable upbringing and was the proportionate outcome.
6. The application was granted. Provision was made for the father’s direct and indirect contact with A.

The judgment records an earlier relocation application refused by District Judge Sethi on 31 March 2015. The mother’s appeal from that decision was withdrawn. Hague Convention proceedings in the United States resulted in an order for A’s return, after which the present first-instance application was determined.