Borough of Telford and Wrekin v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

[2016] EWHC 3073 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2016] EWHC 3073 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
1 December 2016
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Planning law Judicial review
Keywords
section 288 statutory review National Planning Policy Framework out-of-date development plan policies best and most versatile agricultural land paragraph 14 presumption open countryside planning balance heritage assets
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

On a statutory planning review, the court reviews legality, not the merits or weight assigned to planning considerations. Previous planning permissions may be material when assessing whether development-plan policies remain up to date. NPPF paragraph 112 requires consideration of best and most versatile agricultural land but is not a policy indicating that development should be restricted under paragraph 14. The NPPF does not give blanket protection to the countryside or make out-of-date housing policies irrelevant.

Factual background

The Council applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an Inspector’s decision allowing an appeal concerning outline permission for up to 330 dwellings at land north of Haygate Road, Wellington. The Inspector restricted the permission to 290 dwellings because of harm to the setting of Orleton Hall Registered Park and Gardens, and concluded that relevant development-plan policies were out of date.

The Council challenged the decision on Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5; Ground 4 was abandoned. The issues were whether previous permission outside settlement boundaries was relevant, whether saved Policy OL6 applied, whether NPPF paragraph 112 was a restrictive policy for paragraph 14 purposes, and whether Policy CS7 was out of date.

Held

  1. The section 288 challenge was confined to legality. The court could not revisit planning merits or the weight given to material considerations.
  2. The Inspector was entitled to rely on a recent permission for a Sustainable Urban Extension outside the settlement boundary as evidence that housing needs might not be met within those boundaries. The weight of that evidence was a matter of planning judgment.
  3. Policy OL6 protected locally important incidental open land within or adjacent to built-up areas. A large tract of agricultural land in agricultural use did not naturally fall within that expression. The Inspector’s separate reasoning concerning Policy OL7 was mistaken but did not undermine his interpretation of Policy OL6.
  4. NPPF paragraph 112 required the benefits of best and most versatile agricultural land to be taken into account and encouraged preference for poorer quality land where significant development was necessary. It did not prohibit development on BMV land or indicate that development should be restricted under paragraph 14. The Inspector was entitled to consider the loss of BMV land in the planning balance and give it modest weight.
  5. The two-stage approach to paragraph 14 was permissible. A restrictive policy may first be considered without the weighted presumption; if its balance favours development, the presumption may re-emerge in the wider planning balance.
  6. The Inspector was entitled to conclude that Policy CS7 was out of date. The NPPF recognised countryside character and beauty but did not impose blanket protection of the countryside.
  7. Permission was refused on Grounds 1, 2 and 5. The application to quash on Ground 3 was refused.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

Dove J granted permission on Ground 3 and refused permission on Grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5. Ground 4 was abandoned. The renewed applications on Grounds 1, 2 and 5 were heard with the substantive hearing. Lang J refused permission on Grounds 1, 2 and 5 and refused the application to quash on Ground 3.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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