Holder v Gedling Borough Council

In determining whether “very special circumstances” justify inappropriate development in the Green Belt, a planning authority must undertake a planning balance. Substantial weight must be given to Green Belt harm, but renewable-energy benefits may be relevant even where similar benefits could be achieved elsewhere. The authority may assess alternatives according to the nature and circumstances of the proposal, including its public importance and the planning objections. A mitigation measure may also be a separate benefit where its intrinsic characteristics improve landscape or ecological conditions. Judicial review does not permit the court to substitute its planning judgment for that of the decision-maker. A Written Ministerial Statement requiring local planning impacts to be addressed does not give a vocal minority decisive influence or remove the planning authority’s statutory discretion.

The claimant sought judicial review of Gedling Borough Council’s decision to grant permission for a 50-metre wind turbine in the Green Belt. An earlier permission had been quashed by the Court of Appeal in [2014] EWCA Civ 599, and the application was subsequently re-determined.

The claimant challenged the reasoning in the officer’s report on renewable-energy benefits, existing solar panels, the financial benefit to the farm, mitigation measures, alternative technologies, horse-rider safety and amenity, and the interpretation of the Written Ministerial Statement of 18 June 2015. The central issue was whether the officer and committee had acted irrationally or otherwise unlawfully in concluding that very special circumstances existed.

1. Claim dismissed. The officer’s report, read fairly and together with the explanation given to the committee, disclosed no irrationality or material legal error.
2. The production of renewable energy and contribution to climate-change objectives could form part of the very special circumstances. Those benefits did not automatically prevail over Green Belt protection and had to be assessed with the other benefits of the proposal. The weight given to each consideration was principally a matter of planning judgment.
3. The committee was entitled to treat the existing solar panels as of limited significance. They could be installed independently of the turbine, and the committee knew of their existence. The court could not infer that they would have altered the outcome.
4. The committee was entitled to proceed on the practical reality of a closely held family farm and the strong business connection between the turbine and the farm. Formal corporate possibilities, including a future sale or distribution of income, did not make the conclusion irrational.
5. A mitigation measure may also constitute a distinct benefit. The proposed planting would partly screen the turbine while independently enhancing landscape character and ecology. Those functions were not mutually exclusive, and their weight was for the planning authority.
6. The alternative-technology assessment was lawful. Alternatives were material considerations, but their relevance and weight depended on the project’s nature and circumstances. The committee had ample evidence of technically feasible alternatives and was not required to devise a hypothetical lower revenue requirement before assessing them.
7. The committee had been informed of the safety and amenity objections of riders, the British Horse Society recommendation, complaints and videos concerning frightened horses. It was entitled to evaluate that evidence and reach its own planning judgment.
8. The Written Ministerial Statement was properly treated as a new material consideration attracting substantial weight. It did not require refusal whenever objections remained, nor did it confer decisive weight on a vocal minority. The committee retained its discretion under section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act and was entitled to balance local objections against the benefits of the development.

The judgment records that an earlier planning permission was quashed by the Court of Appeal in [2014] EWCA Civ 599. The present claim concerned the Council’s subsequent re-determination and grant of permission.