Siddiqui v University of Oxford

Claims concerning educational provision may be actionable where they allege negligent teaching methods or simple operational failures, but decisions involving academic judgment are not justiciable. Claims attacking professional teaching competence ordinarily require expert evidence applying the Bolam test. Expert evidence is not necessarily required for an obvious failure to provide teaching capacity or for operational negligence. On summary judgment, the court must not conduct a mini-trial. A claim should proceed where documentary evidence gives it a real prospect of success. Limitation issues involving date of knowledge, deliberate concealment or discretionary extension under the Limitation Act 1980 may require oral evidence and cross-examination, particularly where the factual and discretionary issues are contested.

The claimant, a former history student at Brasenose College, sought damages from the University for allegedly negligent teaching of an Indian history special subject and for mishandling medical information relevant to his examinations. He alleged that inadequate staffing resulted in deficient teaching and that information concerning depression, anxiety and insomnia was not passed to the appropriate examination authorities.

The University applied under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 24.2 to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment. It argued that the claims were substantively hopeless and time barred. The central questions were whether either limb had a real prospect of success and whether the claimant had a real prospect of overcoming the limitation provisions of the Limitation Act 1980.

1. Disposition. The application to strike out and the application for summary judgment were dismissed. The claim was directed to be fixed for trial as soon as possible.
2. Educational negligence. Claims based on academic judgment, such as the award of a particular examination grade, are not justiciable. Claims concerning negligent teaching methods may be actionable in principle, but ordinarily require assessment under the Bolam test. Simple operational negligence, such as failure to provide teaching because of unavailable staff, may be established without expert evidence where the breach is apparent from the facts.
3. The claim concerning inadequate staffing and under-delivery of the course had a real prospect of success. The documentary responses to a student complaint arguably showed grossly inadequate teaching provision, an intolerable workload and a dispute within the University about responsibility for insufficient teaching capacity. Those matters were for the trial judge, not summary determination.
4. The absence of expert evidence was not fatal. Issues concerning teaching style or academic methods might require expert evidence, but the gravamen of the pleaded case was alleged mis-delivery or under-delivery of teaching. The court left the precise scope of any expert-evidence requirement to the trial judge.
5. The claim concerning medical information also had a real prospect of success, although it appeared weak. Whether the claimant’s discussions with his tutor created a duty to communicate information about his depression, anxiety and insomnia, whether that duty was breached, and whether the University was vicariously liable were matters unsuitable for summary determination.
6. On limitation, the claimant had a real prospect of showing that his date of knowledge under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980 fell within three years before issue. His earlier dissatisfaction with teaching might be found insufficient to amount to knowledge making it reasonable to investigate litigation. The medical-information issue also required consideration of when he knew what information had actually been passed to the examiners.
7. The argument that the University remained in continuing breach until it refused to reopen the examination result was rejected. The contractual cause of action arose on breach and the tortious cause of action when loss and damage were suffered. However, the deliberate-concealment issue under section 32 and the discretionary extension issue under section 33 remained fit for trial. The latter required consideration of all the circumstances and was better determined as a preliminary issue with oral evidence and cross-examination.

First-instance decision. No earlier decision in the same proceedings is stated in the judgment.