Aviva Insurance Ltd v Randive

Permission to bring contempt proceedings for false statements verified by a statement of truth requires a strong prima facie case that the statements were false and made without an honest belief in their truth. The court must not finally determine the merits at the permission stage. It must also consider whether prosecution is in the public interest, proportionate and consistent with the overriding objective. Separate false statements may be assessed cumulatively where they contribute to the overall picture of a claim. Permission may therefore be refused for an insufficient allegation but granted for other allegations where the seriousness, potential effect on the claim and public interest justify the use of court resources.

The applicant insurer sought permission under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 81.12(3), to pursue contempt proceedings against the respondent for allegedly false statements in a witness statement and responses to a Part 18 request. The statements had been made in a discontinued personal-injury claim arising from a road traffic accident. The County Court had found the claim fundamentally dishonest and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant's costs.

A separate contempt allegation concerned an affidavit. No permission was required for that allegation, which was to be heard later. The central issue was whether the applicant had shown a strong prima facie case, and whether pursuing contempt proceedings on the relevant grounds was in the public interest, proportionate and consistent with the overriding objective.

1. Permission threshold. The court adopted the principles summarised in Kirk v Walton [2009] EWHC 1780. Permission requires a strong prima facie case that the statements were false and made without an honest belief in their truth. The court should avoid deciding the ultimate merits on material not tested by oral evidence.
2. Public interest and proportionality. Even where the threshold is met, the court must consider the public interest, proportionality and the overriding objective. Relevant considerations include the money involved, the importance of the case and the appropriate allocation of court resources. A series of untruths may properly be viewed together rather than in isolation.
3. Ground 1. The applicant did not establish a strong prima facie case that the respondent's account of experiencing pain and stopping during his journey was knowingly false. The absence of an injury entry in the GP notes did not prove that the respondent had not mentioned the accident, applying Denton Hall Legal Services & Others v Kathryn Hilary Fifield [2006] EWCA Civ 169. Permission was refused on this ground.
4. Grounds 2 to 4. There was a strong prima facie case that the respondent knowingly misstated that he had stopped driving for six months, that the insured vehicle had shunted his vehicle forward by a few metres, and that he had lost ten working days because of accident-related injury. The statements concerned matters capable of affecting the assessment of injury and loss. Their pursuit was proportionate when considered with the other alleged untruths. Permission was granted under rule 81.12(3) on Grounds 2, 3 and 4.

The judgment records that the respondent's underlying personal-injury claim was discontinued at trial before District Judge Robson at Eastbourne County Court on 30 April 2015. The District Judge found the claim fundamentally dishonest and made an order for costs. This judgment concerned permission to pursue separate contempt proceedings; it was not an appeal from the County Court decision.