Budheo, R (On the Application Of) v Revenue & Customs

An application for permission to seek judicial review should be brought promptly. Time begins when the challenged public procedure or decision is initiated, rather than when a continuing state of affairs is alleged to end. A claimant’s pursuit of another remedy does not, without more, justify delay. Where proceedings are brought approximately three years after the relevant procedure began, an extension of time will ordinarily be inconsistent with the public interest in the prompt resolution of challenges to public decisions.

The claimant sought permission to bring judicial review proceedings concerning HM Revenue and Customs’ initiation of a Code of Practice 9 investigation on 6 December 2013. He had complained promptly at the time and threatened judicial review in correspondence during February 2014, but did not issue the claim until substantially out of time. He had pursued remedies through the Tax Tribunal. The court considered whether time should be extended and whether the proposed grounds, including alleged engagement of Article 6 rights and irrationality, were arguable.

1. Permission refused. The court refused permission principally because there was no legitimate basis for extending time. Time began to run when the Code of Practice 9 procedure was initiated on 6 December 2013. This was not a continuing state of affairs. The claimant was required to respond promptly to the decision then made.
2. The claimant’s contemporaneous correspondence showed that he understood the issue and had threatened judicial review. His decision to pursue remedies through the Tax Tribunal did not justify the delay. The claim form was served out of time.
3. Challenges to public decisions must be brought promptly. The public has an interest in such challenges being resolved without indefinite delay. After approximately three years, allowing the claim to proceed would not serve the interests of justice or the public interest.
4. The court made no ruling on whether the Code of Practice 9 letter constituted a charge engaging Article 6. It nevertheless observed that, in the circumstances and having regard to HM Revenue and Customs’ reasons for suspicion, the claimant had no reasonable prospect of establishing an Article 6 breach. Nor was an irrationality challenge reasonably arguable.

Not an appeal. The judgment records that the chronology was set out in the decision of the single judge on paper, but gives no citation for that decision.